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F Articles I
Resistance is Futile: How Legal
Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the
Law's Marginalization of Outsider
Voices
Kathryn M. Stanchi*
I. Introduction
Language is powerful. It is not only the method by which
human beings communicate, but it also reflects and creates human
social relations. As a reflection of society, language can function
as a marker-as an indicator of the speaker's class, gender, or
position in society.' In addition, language is an "active compo-
nent" in the creation and constitution of social relations.2 Indeed,
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. I wish to thank Jo
Anne Durako, Michael Smith, Jan M. Levine, Susan L. DeJarnatt, Marina Angel and
Richard K. Neumann, Jr. for their insightful critique of earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks
also to Ayad M. Nalu and Amy Webb for their invaluable help with research and footnotes.
This Article was supported by grants from the Temple University School of Law.
The phrase "Resistance is Futile" is borrowed from StarTrek: The Next Generation.
See Star Trek: The Next Generation: The Best of Both Worlds, No. 73 (Sept. 17, 1990).
1. See Pauline Burton, Women and Second Language Use: An Introduction, in
BILINGUAL WOMEN: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO SECOND LANGUAGE USE 1, 6-11
(Pauline Burton et al. eds., 1994).
2. See Penelope Harvey, The Presence and Absence of Speech, in BILINGUAL WOMEN:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO SECOND LANGUAGE USE 44, 49 (Pauline Burton et
al. eds., 1994); DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM AND LINGUISTIC THEORY 1 (2d ed. 1992);
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language has the power to regulate human social relations in subtle
ways that are difficult to see. It is a powerful tool of social
conditioning-because language and words encompass cultural
norms and conventions.4 What does it mean to act like a "lady?"
Is it a sign of rudeness or interest to interrupt someone who is
talking? Is the use of a qualifying word or phrase (maybe, I'm not
sure) a way to be more accurate or a sign of weakness?
Teaching a new language teaches not only a new vocabulary,
but a new culture, with history, rules, customs and conventions.
Whether interrupting is a sign of interest or rudeness may depend
on a variety of factors, including the culture of the speaker and
audience, the geographic region, and the interrupter's tone.5 To
communicate effectively, the speaker must understand the customs
and culture of the language. Otherwise, use of the vocabulary,
however accurate, will be ineffective.
In the first year of law school, legal writing is the course
dedicated to teaching students to communicate effectively using the
language of law.6 In the last two decades, legal writing pedagogy
has focused on methods of teaching language and language skills.'
This focus has resulted in a dual strategy represented by the two
prevailing methods of teaching legal writing: the process view and
the social view.8 Both views emphasize that to communicate as a
lawyer-to be heard--the writer or speaker must become a
member of the culture and community of legal practice."
The process view teaches the writer to focus on the audience
to which the communication is directed, the purpose of the
Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature
of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886,887 (1989) ("Language, and the thoughts
that it expresses, is socially constructed and socially constituting.").
3. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 1.
4. See id. at 189.
5. See, e.g., William Safire, On Language: New Yorkese, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 19,
1997, at 36.
6. See J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69
WASH. L. REV. 35, 60-61 (1994); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Words From the Podium, THE
SCRIVENER (Scribes-The American Society of Writers on Legal Subjects) (Summer 1997),
at 2-3.
7. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 51-54.
8. See id. at 51-61.
9. I use "heard" in both its common and legal meaning. To be "heard" in common
parlance means to have one's voice reach another's ear. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 559 (9th ed. 1991). In legal parlance, it has a somewhat narrower
meaning-it means to be listened to and understood. See Finley, supra note 2, at 903.
10. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 59-61.
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communication, and the constraints placed on the document by
context and the conventions of the legal community.1 In this
way, the process view recognizes that language is interactive-its
effectiveness depends not only on the writer, but also on the
reader.' The social view attacks the teaching of legal language by
having as its goal the socialization or acculturation of the novice
legal communicator into the legal "discourse community" through
the learning of legal vocabulary, legal customs, and legal culture. 3
Both pedagogies have proven to be quite effective in teaching
law students the language of law and introducing them to the legal
discourse community. But, because legal writing pedagogy reflects
the biases in legal language (including legal reasoning), its effective-
ness in "socializing" law students comes at the price of suppressing
the voices of those who have already been historically marginalized
by legal language.'4 Law is a species of language that some
linguists call a "language of power" or "high language"-a
prestigious type of language that must be used if the speaker is to
function effectively and to which only the most powerful members
of society have access.5
Linguists have identified a tension associated with languages
of power and those traditionally excluded from them: should the
marginalized embrace the language of power, and risk being
coopted by it, or reject the language of power and risk not being
11. See Jo Anne Durako et al., From Product to Process: Evolution of a Legal Writing
Program, 58 U. PIrr. L. REV. 719, 722 (1997).
12. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 225; Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal
Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372, 393-94 (1996).
13. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 56-61; Joseph M. Williams, On the
Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 1, 13-14 (1991). Discourse community refers to the social context in which speaking
or writing takes place-for example the people, the culture, the history. See Rideout &
Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 57-58; see also infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
14. As a shorthand, I refer to those people who have been traditionally excluded from
the creation and practice of the law as "outsiders." This has become something of a term
of art. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds In
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1988); Margaret E. Montoya,
Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While UnBraiding Latina Stories and
Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 185 n.1 (1994) [hereinafter Montoya,
Trenzas].
15. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 199, 205; Finley, supra note 2, at 888 ("Law is a
language of power, a particularly authoritative discourse."). Marginalized groups may be
denied access to the language through exclusion from the educational process or through
societal or cultural expectations that the language is off-limits. See CAMERON, supra note 2,
at 205.
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heard?16 In the legal writing context, the dilemma for the teacher
is whether the teacher should "socialize" the student to the culture
and language of law, thereby risking that the already marginalized
will be further marginalized. Of course, the risk of cooption
involves more than the loss or compromise of the individual's voice,
which itself is no small thing.17 But, because language is such a
powerful social tool, encouraging "socialization" means that legal
writing pedagogy is contributing to the suppression of certain
unique and valuable voices, cultures and concepts in law, and
ensuring that law remains a language of power and privilege. 8
On the other hand, if students are not socialized, have legal writing
teachers "set up" already marginalized students to fail in legal
practice? 9
This Article will examine the ways in which legal writing
pedagogy contributes to the marginalization of outsider voices in
the law. 20  In Part II, the Article explores the two reigning
pedagogies of legal writing and describes the linguistic model used
to gauge how teaching law as language marginalizes outsider voices.
In Part III, the Article applies the linguistic model to explore
16. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 222; see also ELIZABETH MERTZ, LINGUISTIC
CONSTRUCTIONS OF DIFFERENCE AND HISTORY IN THE U.S. LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM 24
(1996) (American Bar Foundation Working Paper No. 9419) (stating that professors are
trapped by the need to socialize students effectively fo the system within which the students
will be working).
17. See Finley, supra note 2, at 894 n.39 (recounting women law students' alienation
from the law as analogous to being forced to become bilingual and fearing loss of native
tongue); see also Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman who
Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 247 (1996);
Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1299, 1305 (1988). The assimilation into legal culture can be particularly harmful to
outsider law students. See Montoya, Trenzas, supra note 14, at 198 (postulating that for
outsiders, "masking" through assimilation into legal culture is self-hating and has
psychological and ideological consequences).
18. See Angel, supra note 17, at 247. Professor Angel writes:
To overcome the biases built into our current laws and perceptions of facts, we
must expand our students' perspectives at the beginning of law school. Otherwise,
by the end of the first year both our methods of teaching and our teaching of
existing doctrine result in fashioning intellectual clones who reflect society's biases.
Id. (citations omitted).
19. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Perspectives on the Ideological Impact of
Legal Education Upon the Profession, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1259, 1270 (1994) ("It would be
unfortunate, indeed, if in attempting to correct a systemic problem in which men and their
values predominate, law schools further undermined women's capacities to compete in a
male world.")
20. This Article focuses on legal writing pedagogy. Other law school courses certainly
"mute" outsider students. How they do so is beyond the scope of this Article.
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specific examples of how legal writing pedagogy may contribute to
the marginalization of certain groups by focusing on audience and
socializing them into the culture and language of law. In Part IV,
the Article considers various solutions, all of which include the
suggestion that law school must teach more critical legal theory and
methodology in the first year, in a way that demonstrates how to
incorporate them into legal practice. The Article concludes that,
notwithstanding the practical problems associated with this
suggestion, the academy should consider expanding legal writing
courses to teach students to incorporate concepts of critical theory
into the art of lawyering.
II. Legal Writing Pedagogy and "Muting"
The two pedagogies of legal writing that prevail today in most
American law schools with professional, long-term legal writing
teachers-the "process" method and the "social" view-are built
around the idea that legal writing is a way of teaching law as a
language.21 The term language is used broadly here; to teach law
students how to communicate effectively in the language of law,
legal writing must teach, among other things: how to master the
appropriate tone, how to understand the culture and customs of the
law, and how to use facts, reasoning, and analogy consistent with
the law's rules and constraints.22 In other words, the goal of legal
writing is to teach students how to be lawyers. The two pedagogies
are complementary and many teachers of legal writing use them in
tandem with one another.23 However, the two methods have
somewhat different, albeit complementary, goals, and have some
methodological differences as well.24 Section A will explore the
process and social views of teaching legal writing by discussing the
goals, methodologies, and contextual teaching frameworks of the
two views. Section B describes the linguistic model of "muting,"
which I use to evaluate how legal writing pedagogy affects outsider
voices.
21. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 63; see also Teresa Godwin Phelps, The
New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089, 1090 (1986).
22. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 57; Williams, supra note 13, at 16, 23.
23. See, e.g., Jan M. Levine, Legal Research and Writing Course Materials (Spring 1997)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Levine, Course Materials]; see also Phelps, supra note 21,
at 1091, 1094.
24. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 57.
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A. Legal Writing Pedagogy: The Process and Social Views
The process view of legal writing instruction is methodological-
ly "inner-directed"-it focuses on the development of the writer's
personal method or process of writing:25 One of the primary goals
of the process approach is to move the writer away from a "writer-
based prose," to a "reader-based prose" by encouraging the writer
to focus on the audience of the document, the purpose of the
document, and the formal constraints placed on the document by
the rhetorical situation. 6 Methodologically, the touchstone of the
process view is that the process of writing is not only knowable, but
teachable, and that the way to teach writing is for the teacher to
actively "intervene" in many stages of the writing process.27 The
"interventions" emblematic of the process view are used in
professional legal writing programs across the country: the
requirement that students write numerous drafts of documents,
pointed and frequent professorial written critique of drafts,
individual conferences between professors and students to expand
on and explain the critique, and student rewrites incorporating the
critique.28
Included within the process view of legal writing is the
"epistemic" view of writing, which emphasizes writing as think-
ing." The epistemic perspective is that the process of writing is
more than merely communicating knowledge, but a way of
generating knowledge.3 ° In the realm of legal writing, the epis-
temic view teaches that by writing, and concomitantly by analyzing,
analogizing, and reasoning, lawyers are intimately involved in
"constructing" the law.3' An example of the epistemic view in law
is a lawyer who has, through the process of document drafting,
come to view the issues in a case differently, or has changed the
focus or arguments of a legal case; that lawyer has gained knowl-
edge by the act of writing (and maybe her audience will gain
25. See id.; see also Phelps, supra note 21, at 1089-90.
26. Phelps, supra note 21, at 1094; see also Durako et al., supra note 11, at 722-23; Little,
supra note 12, at 392 (outlining how audience is crucial to effective legal rhetoric).
27. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 52-53.
28. See Durako et al., supra note 11, at 722-26.
29. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 54; see also generally Phillip Kissam,
Thinking (by Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REv. 135 (1987).
30. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 55.
31. See id. at 57.
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knowledge, too). Thus, the epistemic view fits within the process
pedagogy because it emphasizes writing as a recursive and
overlapping process of thinking, analyzing, and writing.
The other dominant pedagogy that has emerged in the legal
writing field is the social view, so called because it urges the writer
to look beyond the personal process of writing to the context or
culture in which the document is produced.32 The social view,
much more explicitly than the process view, is about law as a
language, with its own culture, vocabulary, and customs.33 As with
any language, true fluency in law requires not just understanding
the dictionary definition of the vocabulary or the rhetoric, but how
to use the vocabulary and rhetoric correctly and effectively in a
given context.34 The social view regards law as a complex and
highly conventionalized discourse and posits that the goal of legal
writing training must be to introduce and socialize students into
that discourse.35 Scholarship describing the social view, as one
might expect, is rife with words like acculturation, socialization, and
initiation.36 The goal of the social perspective is to get students
immersed in legal language and culture-into the discourse
community-so that their speech and writing marks them as
experts, not novices.37 Methodologically, the social perspective
values active learning by immersion and dialogue.38 Students
learn to lawyer by practicing writing documents that lawyers write
32. See id. at 56-57.
33. See id. at 57.
34. See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking
Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 163, 184-85 (1993). A good example of this true fluency
is the use of legal vocabulary. As any legal writing professor could tell you, a law student's
full understanding of the meaning of specialized legal terms (stipulate, motion, estoppel) only
begins with Black's Law Dictionary. The true and complete meaning of these words requires
an understanding of the context in which these words are used-as Fajans and Falk put it,
an understanding of the entire set of discourse practices that underlie the words. See id.
Legal writing is one law school course that not only puts words like this in context, but
teaches students how to use them correctly in legal documents.
35. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 57; Williams, supra note 13, at 9, 13, 24-
30. A "discourse" is not only a language or a text, but is a "historically, socially and institu-
tionally specific structure of statements, terms, categories, and beliefs." Finley, supra note
2, at 888 n.12.
36. See Phelps, supra note 21, at 1091 (noting that in their first year of law school,
students "begin an initiation" by "mastering a new 'tribal speech"'); Rideout & Ramsfield,
supra note 6, at 75; Williams, supra note 13, at 23 (drawing directly from cognitive behavioral
theory in describing the socialization of teaching legal writing).
37. See Williams, supra note 13, at 16; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
38. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 63-65.
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and speaking in contexts in which lawyers speak. For example, in
most legal writing courses, students write multiple drafts of legal
memoranda and briefs; in many other legal writing courses,
students also draft client letters and complaints.39 These exercises
require students to enter the discourse community of the law; the
students and legal writing professors then engage in a dialogue
through the professors' critiques on the drafts, individual conferenc-
es with the professor, and student redrafts.
40
The social method's emphasis on context is also demonstrated
by legal writing courses that teach legal language through first-year
moot court, mock law firm models, and lawyer role-play.4 These
methodologies teach the language of law by placing students in
true-to-life lawyering situations that require the students to speak
and write law like a lawyer. Another example of active socializa-
tion is the trend in legal writing courses toward requiring first-year
students to extract the legal issues and relevant facts from a legal
record comprised of the types of legal documents that lawyers deal
with all the time, such as depositions, pleadings, and trial tran-
scripts. In this way, legal writing differs from many law school
courses in which students are given facts that are already digested
and summarized, such as the ones that students read in most edited
case books.
42
Of course, the process and social views complement each
other: one cannot effectively envision and reach one's audience,
understand the purpose of a document and its constraints, as
required by the process view, unless one understands the discourse
community of which one's audience is a part and the context in
39. See, e.g., LINDA HOLDEMAN EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS AND
ORGANIZATION 1, 147, 309 (1996); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND
LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 1, 67, 241, 301, 345 (3d ed. 1998);
DIANA V. PRATT, LEGAL WRITING: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 1, 145, 252 (2d ed. 1993);
Durako et al., supra note 11, at 726-27.
40. See Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Beth Beazley, Teaching Students How to "Think
Like Lawyers": Integrating Socratic Method With the Writing Process, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 885,
891-99 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Daan Braveman, Law Firm: A First-Year Course on Lawyering, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 501, 502 (1989); Bari Burke, Legal Writing (Groups) at the University of
Montana: Professional Voice Lessons in a Communal Context, 52 MONT. L. REV. 373, 391-96
(1991); Nancy M. Maurer & Linda Fitts Mischler, Introduction to Lawyering: Teaching First-
Year Students to Think Like Professionals, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 96, 99 (1994); Rideout &
Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 69, 72.
42. See Durako et al., supra note 11, at 726.
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which the document will be used.43 The process and social views
also share an emphasis on externally defined constraints and
contexts. Although the process approach has been criticized by
those favoring the social view for being too "inner-directed"
because it deemphasizes social context by focusing on the personal
processes of individual writers," in terms of substance and lan-
guage the process approach requires that the writer write for an
external audience and an externally-defined purpose.45 Similarly,
under the social view, the unacculturated legal writer must learn to
write within a discourse community that is foreign to the writer-to
do so, the writer must adopt as context that which the discourse
community defines as context. Finally, both methods also require
a great deal of preparation and work from the professor. Both
methods value individual attention to the student in the form of
conferences and critiques of numerous drafts and redrafts, two very
time-consuming tasks for the professor.4 Both views additionally
require a substantial time commitment to devise problems and
prepare exercises that simulate the lawyering context in a way that
reflects real-life lawyering while at the same time preserving
pedagogic value to the students.
The general framework within which the social and process
views are implemented is similar in legal writing programs
throughout the country: a litigation context that focuses on writing
memoranda of law to teach "objective" or predictive legal writing
and appellate or trial briefs to teach persuasive writing. 7 Objec-
tive writing is traditionally taught first, usually in the fall semester
of legal writing.48 Generally, students are given legal documents,
asked to determine the issue and relevant facts, to research and
analyze the relevant body of law, and to determine how the law
resolves the dispute.49 Legal writing identifies the audience of
43. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 34, at 176.
44. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 51-52.
45. See id. at 51; Phelps, supra note 21, at 1090-92.
46. One commentator estimates that an effective critique of a student memorandum by
an experienced legal writing professional takes about ninety minutes. See Jan M. Levine,
Response: "You Can't Please Everyone, So You'd Better Please Yourself": Directing (or
Teaching in) a First Year-Legal Writing Program, 29 VAL. U.L. REV. 611, 623 (1995).
47. See, e.g., Durako et al., supra note 11, at 726-27 (describing Villanova Law School's
legal writing program); EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 2-3, 153; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at
67, 350-51; Levine, Course Materials, supra note 23.
48. See Durako et al., supra note 11, at 726; Levine, Course Materials, supra note 23.
49. See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 53-54.
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predictive writing as a supervisory lawyer who is unfamiliar with
the law raised by the issues of the factual scenario-someone who
has asked the junior lawyer to research and analyze for him.5 °
The writer's purpose in creating an office memorandum is primarily
to communicate to the reader the writer's professional opinion
about the outcome of the case and to use legal authority to
demonstrate the reasoning supporting that opinion.5
After learning the basics of legal analysis and communication
in the fall, legal writing then introduces law students to advocacy,
which generally includes two components: persuasive writing and
oral advocacy.52 Students are given a litigation scenario and are
assigned a client. The purpose of the document is to convince a
judge or court to rule in favor of the client and the target audience
of the document is the judge or court.53 One of the purposes of
teaching persuasive writing in the first year is to acclimate students
to the language of advocacy: its tone, its use of authority and
rhetorical devices, its strategies. Teaching persuasive writing also
teaches students a great deal about context; it introduces students
to litigation and requires students to argue a case within a given
procedural posture.54
The goals, methodologies, and teaching framework of both the
process and social views of legal writing teach law students how to
communicate the language of the law effectively. The dilemma
arises because these goals, methodologies, and framework are the
tools by which legal writing contributes to the marginalization of
outsider voices in the law. The following section presents a model
of linguistics called "muting," which is the model used in this
Article to evaluate the effect of legal writing pedagogy on first-year
law students.
B. Linguistic Theories of Muting and Determinism
The term "muting," as used in this Article, refers to the
situation in which individuals without power in a given society are
50. See Durako et al., supra note 11, at 728 n.31; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 67-68. I
use "him" purposefully here. Despite the influx of women into law schools in the 1970s,
studies show that women are not largely represented in the supervisory and partner positions
in law firms and legal organizations. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
51. See Durako et al., supra note 11, at 728; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 67-72.
52. See Durako et al., supra note 11, at 728 ; Levine, Course Materials, supra note 23.
53. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 253.
54. See id.
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silenced by language. The term "muting" originated with Edwin
and Shirley Ardener, social anthropologists who, in the 1970s,
began to examine how social anthropology had ignored women and
their voices.55 Muting theory is based on the idea that different
groups in a society will generate different realities and have
different experiences and perspectives.56 However, because not
all groups have equal power in society, all groups will not have
equal access to the language through which experiences, realities,
and perspectives are expressed. 7 Under the muting theory, the
language through which one can communicate, or express one's
reality, is created and controlled by the "dominant group. 58
Thus, the only mode of expression that is heard or listened to is the
dominant language.59 Muting occurs within the subdominant
groups in society because the "fit" between the subdominant reality
or experience and the acceptable mode of expression is "imper-
fect." Individual members of subdominant groups are muted in the
sense that they are forced to express their reality in an imperfect
way by using the language of the dominant group.60  In other
words, subdominant groups are forced to "translate" or "encode"
their experiences and realities into terms understood by the
dominant group-the experiences of the subdominant groups
cannot be expressed in "their own terms" because the precise terms
do not exist.61
Muting theory seems to be derived, in part, from the theory of
linguistic determinism, the foundation of which is that language
55. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 140-41.
56. See id. at 140-41; Shirley Ardener, Introduction to PERCEIVING WOMEN vii, xii
(Shirley Ardener ed., 1975) [hereinafter Ardener].
57. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 141. Muting theory posits that not every group has
equal access to the "mode of specification," which Deborah Cameron translates as "the
linguistic system through which realities are publicly articulated." Id.
58. See id.; Ardener, supra note 56, at xii.
59. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 141; Ardener, supra note 56, at xii.
60. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 141; Ardener, supra note 56, at xii.
61. CAMERON, supra note 2, at 141; Ardener, supra note 56, at xii. An example of this
is women's experience of sexual harassment before the term "sexual harassment" entered
the English language. Women experienced unpleasant and unwanted sexual joking,
overtures, and gestures that made their employment situations intolerable, but before the
existence of the term "sexual harassment" (widely credited to Catharine Mackinnon), it was
difficult to express that "reality" because it had no mode of expression, no name. Angel,
supra note 17, at 236 (citing also marital rape, stalking, and separation attack as other exam-
ples); Finley, supra note 2, at 909.
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creates our thoughts, our perception, and our reality.62  To
determinists, language is extremely powerful-ideas or experiences
for which there is no language simply do not "exist."63 Determin-
ism and muting theory share the idea that language can distort
reality and alienate outsiders:
It is language that determines the limits of our world which
constructs our reality ... Human beings cannot impartially
describe the universe because in order to describe it they must
first have a classification system. But, paradoxically, once they
have that classification system, once they have language, they
can see only certain arbitrary things.'
The paradox of determinism, of course, is how outsiders or their
experiences can "exist," since they have no language to express
themselves.65 The answer seems to be that determinism is not
absolute; one version of determinist theory is that language creates
a self-perpetuating reality that is biased toward the powerful-by
definition, those who control the language.66 So, experiences do
not "exist" in the sense that they are not heard and they are not
"heard" because there is no language to express them. Thus, the
reality created by language is self-perpetuating because the non-
powerful are forced to support the hierarchy by learning, writing,
and speaking the language.67  The ideological biases in language
may be obvious or may be more subtle.6' For example, words
may encode a particular point of view implicitly: thus, in English,
the word "motherhood" has primarily nurturing, caring, and
positive connotations. 69 There is no word that connotes negative
feelings about motherhood-which many women may have-so,
implicitly, the language has not only made invisible negative
62. In this way, the "epistemic" view of legal writing subscribes, in part, to the
determinist view of language, because the epistemic view is that by writing law, we construct
and create law. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
63. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 141. Determinists believe that "[w]ithout language,
thought is a vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct
before the appearance of language." Id. Think of the Zen riddle of whether a tree falling
in a forest makes a sound if no one is in the forest to hear it. Does your experience exist
in any real way if you cannot express it?
64. Id. at 146-47 (quoting DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE 139 (1980)).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 130, 146-49.
67. See id. at 149.
68. E.g., the use of "man" to mean human in English.
69. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 149.
[Vol. 103:1
RESISTANCE IS FUTILE
feelings about motherhood, but has also implicitly marked them as
deviant by excluding them from the linguistic community.7"
Muting theory seems to fall within this less absolute version of
determinist theory, although muting theory strongly endorses the
premise that the different, unique perspectives and experiences of
subdominant groups exist. Under muting theory the fault is in the
"fit" between language and experience; determinist theory focuses
on the power of language to suppress the existence of any perspec-
tive and experience that falls outside its culture and vocabulary.71
There are several important consequences that result from the
muting of subdominant groups and the power of language to
determine our reality.72 First, the result of the imperfect fit of
language and reality means that subdominant groups may be
viewed as "inarticulate" because of their inability to express
themselves using the dominant language.73 Second, and relatedly,
subdominant groups may be silent about "matters of special
concern" for which there is no mode of expression in the dominant
model, which means that these experiences and special concerns
remain invisible to society and to those with the power to change
social conditions.74 Finally, the existence of a dominant language,
and the requirement that an individual use it to be heard, means
that alternative methods of expression will be suppressed or
inhibited. This is where muting theory overlaps considerably
with determinism; because language determines our reality, any
experiences for which there is no language are non-existent because
they do not have meaning to the powerful.76 If alternative models
70. See id. Another example is how the need for modifiers "single," "working," or
"welfare" for the word "mother" means that the word "mother" means a woman who is
married, supported by her husband, and not working. Any "mother" who does not fit this
definition is "subtly deviant." Finley, supra note 2, at 887.
71. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 141-42.
72. See id. at 141; Ardener, supra note 56, at xii.
73. See Ardener, supra note 56, at xii.
74. See id. "Muting" theory has much in common with Catherine MacKinnon's
"dominance" theory of feminist jurisprudence. Both theories presume that a dominant group
controls important aspects of society. For muting theorists, it is language, for MacKinnon
it is women's sexuality. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 127 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE].
75. See Ardener, supra note 56, at xii.
76. Of course, under an extreme determinist view, such ideas and experiences would not
even exist, because there would be no language for them. But assuming a less extreme
determinist view, the outcome is that such ideas cannot be expressed, or can be expressed
only partially or falsely. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 130.
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are created-to the extent that realities can or do exist separate
from language-they are devalued by the dominant culture their
use is discouraged, and their speakers labeled inarticulate.77 Thus,
those in subdominant groups learn that their experiences are
unimportant because there is either no language or imperfect
language for them, and that any alternative models or languages
are inferior.
III. How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Muting of
Outsider Voices
Legal writing pedagogy contributes to the muting of outsider
voices in the law because it teaches law as a language, and thereby
both reflects and perpetuates the biases in legal language and
reasoning. Indeed, because of the degree of cultural and ideologi-
cal bias contained in the language of law, legal writing's effective-
ness in teaching that language is directly proportional to its
effectiveness in muting outsider voices: the better legal writing is
at teaching the language of law, the more effective it is at muting
those individuals whose voices are not included in the language of
the law, and the more effective legal writing is at ensuring that
those voices will continue not to be heard in the legal context. In
this way, legal writing pedagogy results in the consequences
predicted by muting theory: individual voices of subdominant
/outsider group members are silenced or devalued, the creation of
subdominant/outsider models or languages are suppressed and
discouraged, and if created, are devalued. Therefore, the experi-
ences and realities of subdominant/outsider groups are rendered
invisible.78
The process view of legal writing contributes to the muting of
outsider voices primarily through its emphasis on audience. The
goal of the process method of legal writing to make the writer
more outer-directed and more focused on audience means that to
succeed in legal writing, the outsider writer must learn to think,
77. See id. at 142, 188; Ardener, supra note 56, at xii. An example of this is Black
English, or what has been controversially labeled "Ebonics." The use of this "subdominant"
language in, for example, professional legal writing is unthinkable, not because it cannot be
understood, but because the "dominant" group views it as slang. It is not difficult to imagine
the label "illiterate" being attached to, for example, a lawyer who attempted to write a
document in Black English, even if a person fluent in that language would easily understand
the concepts in the document.
78. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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write, and reason in a way that will be heard by those in positions
of power in the law. That means that thoughts must be "translat-
ed" or "encoded" into language that the audience will "hear."79
Indeed, it is the goal of the process method to have novice legal
writers "internalize" the perspective of the legal audience so as to
be able to edit documents effectively.80  In the documents tradi-
tionally taught in first-year legal writing programs, predictive
memoranda and briefs, the audience is either a supervisory lawyer
or a judge.8 Statistically, white, upper-middle class, heterosexual
men tend to be overrepresented in these positions.82 Even in
those limited circumstances in which an outsider is in a position of
authority, that outsider is likely to be a person who has successfully
assimilated into the culture and language of the law.83
Because the social view has as its explicit goal the assimilation
of the novice legal writer, it demonstrates the dilemma most
acutely.' Although this goal envisions mostly that the student
will gain new knowledge and skill, the goal of assimilation carries
79. See supra notes 55-77 (outlining muting theory); Little, supra note 12, at 394.
80. Kearney & Beazley, supra note 40, at 900-01.
81. See Durako et al., supra note 11 at 728; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 67-68, 254.
82. See, e.g., Michael A. Cardozo, Diversity: The Profession Must Do Better, 44TH
STREET NOTES (Association of the Bar of the City of New York, New York, N.Y.) Dec.
1997, at 1 (pointing out the dearth of women and African-Americans in positions of power
in large New York law firms); Sam Attlesey, Standoff Between Judicial Reformers Stalls
Legislation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 20, 1997, at 48A, available in 1997 WL 2663201
(noting that, in Texas, only 10% of appeals court judges are minorities, only 11% of the 396
district court judges are black or Hispanic, and that there are no American Indian or Asian-
American judges in the entire state); see also Randi Lowenthal, Learning to Deal With
Diversity in the Office, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 31, 1998, at 1, 5 (noting that women are
three times less likely to make partner in large New York City law firms than men and
revealing that only 5% of the 173 associates made partners in 1996-97 at New York's 25
largest firms were black).
83. Indeed, that is at the heart of the dilemma of this Article. This should make clear
that the thesis of this Article is by no means that outsiders cannot succeed in the law or
become "fluent" legal communicators, but that, to do so, they must assimilate. A study
conducted by Dr. Sandra Janoff demonstrates the power of the assimilation process of the
first year of law school. See Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral
Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193, 204-208. Dr. Janoff studied the 417 members of Temple
University Law School's first-year class of 1992. See id. at 209. She used three sources of
data collection to gauge moral reasoning: (1) the Washington University Sentence
Completion Test, (2) the Real-Life Moral Conflict and Choice Interview, and (3) a
demographic information questionnaire. See id. at 211-12. Dr. Janoff concluded that women
tended to enter law school oriented to interpersonal relationships, but after one year, women
tended to suppress their relational orientation and engage much more frequently in hierarchi-
cal, rights-based reasoning. See id. at 238.
84. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
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with it the consequence that some part of one's self is replaced or
lost.85 In the context of new language acquisition, both in law and
other disciplines, what is lost is not just voice, but perspective and
culture.86
Finally, the epistemic view confirms that the muting of outsider
voices damages not only the individual members of subdominant
groups and the groups collectively, but also limits and cramps the
dominant language.87 The epistemic view, like the determinist
theory, is that writing law is a way of creating and constructing
law.88 By contributing to the muting of outsider voices in the law,
legal writing pedagogy ensures that the biases in legal language and
reasoning will be perpetuated and new languages or realities will be
devalued and suppressed.89 Muting means that law will continue
to lack the richness and diversity that should come with having
lawyers from varied races, genders, ethnicities, and sexual orienta-
tions.
Thus, legal writing pedagogy aggravates the already imperfect
fit between outsiders' realities and the language legal writing
imposes on them.9" Consistent with their goals of teaching
effective lawyering "in the real world," neither the process nor the
social pedagogy questions the validity or motives of the external
rules imposed by the audience, language, or context of law. Their
purpose is to ease the students' entry into the community, not to
challenge the customs or culture of the community. Thus, both
views have been criticized-by scholars and first-year law stu-
dents-because in the quest for assimilation, they leave little room
for personal definitions of context, or the development of a
personal, original voice.91 Attention to voice appears occasionally
85. See Weiss & Melling, supra note 17, at 1304, 1314, (describing experiences of women
at Yale Law School).
86. See Burton, supra note 1, at 11-12; Weiss & Melling, supra note 17, at 1320, 1354
(describing how women law students felt loss of voice, but also felt the loss of something
greater than language, something integral to their "womanness").
87. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text; see also Ardener, supra note 56, at
xii (muting of subdominant groups suppresses alternative models).
88. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 60.
91. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 51, 59 (positing that both the social and
process views, by placing a high value on external constraints, contribute to law student
complaints that legal writing stifles originality and creativity). Rideout and Ramsfield note
that neither the process nor the social perspective of legal writing draws much from what
they call the expressivist view of writing, the ultimately "inner directed" view of writing. See
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in scholarship on legal writing pedagogy, but when it does the focus
is largely on enabling the writer to find an authentic professional
voice: in the process approach, by being sensitive to audience and
purpose, and in the social approach, by immersing oneself in the
professional discourse community.92  The muting effects are
exacerbated by the heavy workload and low class hours and credit
awarded to legal research and writing-even the most dedicated
professors are pressed for time and resources to teach students the
basic fundamentals of legal research, writing, and analysis.93
There is little time to engage students in a discussion about voice,
outsider status, or bias in the law without seriously compromising
the goal of teaching basic lawyering.
In the following sections, the article outlines some examples of
muting in the law and how legal writing pedagogy contributes to it:
by teaching students to choose rhetorical frameworks based on
audience, by requiring students to analyze using the factual context
outlined by the courts, by reflecting the law's overvaluation of the
neutral and objective, and by teaching the vocabulary and register
of legal language.94
A. The Problem of Framing the Question
Sensitivity to audience means, in part, characterizing or
framing a legal issue in ways that the legal audience will under-
stand, and using legal terms that are familiar and persuasive to a
legal audience.95 Framing or characterizing the issue in law is an
id. at 51. Under the expressivist view, the task of the writer is to find a means of expressing
one's innermost thoughts; it puts a premium on development of original, spontaneous, and
authentic personal voice. See id.; see also generally Julius G. Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 577 (1988); Elizabeth Perry Hodges, Writing in a Different Voice, 66 TEX. L. REV. 629
(1988); Philip N. Meyer, "Fingers Pointing at the Moon": New Perspectives on Teaching Legal
Writing and Analysis, 25 CONN. L. REV. 777 (1993).
92. See Phelps, supra note 21, at 1098 (explicitly linking the acquisition of an "authentic"
voice with reaching one's intended audience); Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6. at 63
(comparing approach of social view to teaching and learning a foreign language).
93. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 77-78.
94. This certainly is not an exhaustive list of the ways that legal writing pedagogy-and
law school pedagogy generally-mutes outsider voices. The Article does not address, for
example, the cultural and gender biases inherent in the law's dress codes. See, e.g., Mairi N.
Morrison, May it Please Whose Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates Gender Bias in the Real
World of Practice, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 49, 60 (1995).
95. See generally Little, supra note 12, at 392-96; see also Diana Pratt, Representing Non-
Mainstream Clients to Mainstream Judges: A Challenge of Persuasion, 4 J. LEGAL WRITING
79, 82 (1998).
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extremely important tool of advocacy because it dictates what facts
are relevant, what law applies, and who wins.96 Thus, a primary
goal of legal writing, especially in teaching persuasive writing, is to
teach students how to take a set of facts and frame the legal issue
in terms most likely to persuade the audience-a judge or panel of
judges. 7 Although part of the creativity of the law is in choosing
a framework, both the process and social views demonstrate that
the available options are limited by the need to convince the target
audience and by legal convention.98 This creates a "fit" problem
when the outsider lawyer or law student attempts to frame the
issue in a way that reflects her world view.
Consider these questions asked by Professor Lucinda Finley in
her description of the imperfect fit between legal rhetoric and
women's lives:
How can we fit a woman's experience of living in a world of
violent pornography into obscenity doctrine, which is focused
on moral harm to consumers of pornography? How can women
fit the reality of pregnancy into equality doctrine without
getting hung up on the horns of the sameness-difference
dilemma? How can women fit the difference between a wanted
and an unwanted pregnancy into the doctrinal rhetoric of
privacy and "choice"? ... How can women fit the psychologi-
cal and economic realities of being a battered woman into
criminal law, which puts the word "domestic" before "vio-
lence"? ... How ... can [women] fit the experience of having
what a woman thought was a pleasant social interaction but
then crosses the invisible line to become threatening violence,
into rape doctrine?99
Similarly, Professor Clark Cunningham eloquently expressed the
imperfect fit between a client's story and the need to translate it for
a legal audience."' Professor Cunningham chronicled how the
96. See id. at 373-74; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 258-62.
97. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 258-60.
98. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
99. Finley, supra note 2, at 904 (citations omitted); see also Angel, supra note 17, at 235-
36.
100. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1299-1304 (1992).
Another wonderful example of the limitations that legal language places on advocacy is in
Melissa Harrison and Margaret E. Montoya's, Voices! Voces In the Borderlands: A Colloquy
On Re/Constructing Identities in Re/Constructed Legal Spaces, 6 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
387, 429-432 (1996) [hereinafter Montoya, Borderlands]. The story told in Borderlands is of
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law shaped-and misshaped-his representation of Dujon Johnson,
an African-American man stopped, searched, and arrested for
disorderly conduct by a white police officer."' 1 For example,
Professor Cunningham tells how he immediately "translated" Mr.
Johnson's story into the language of law by framing the issue as an
illegal Terry stop and a pretext arrest. °2 Not only did this
translation, or framework, obscure facts important to Mr. Johnson
that were not essential to the Terry-pretext theory,0 3 but it also
did not reflect how Mr. Johnson saw the case."~ To Mr. Johnson,
the fundamental issue in the case was how his dignity and respect
were taken from him by the police officer, who treated Mr.
Johnson like a surly teenager, in part because he was black and had
the temerity to challenge the officer's authority.1"5 Professor
Cunningham struggled with how to incorporate Mr. Johnson's
perspective into the case but in many ways was thwarted by legal
language, which does not provide a framework or vocabulary for
Mr. Johnson's approach to the case.
Mr. Johnson's story quite literally "lost something in the
translation" required by legal language. One of the things lost was
Mr. Johnson's concept of the centrality of race to his legal
predicament. For example, as a direct consequence of the chosen
legal framework, the first tactic in the case was to move to suppress
all of Mr. Johnson's statements occurring after the illegal Terry stop
because these statements were the sole basis for the disorderly
conduct arrest.10 6 So, literally, an effective (perhaps the most
effective) legal strategy involved suppressing Mr. Johnson's voice
and story, which was the primary evidence of Mr. Johnson's theory
that he was arrested because he was an African-American man who
the lawyer representing a developmentally disabled, wheelchair bound, and "almost com-
pletely" non-verbal client whose first language is Spanish. See id.; see also Pratt, supra note
96, 82-106.
101. I hesitate to summarize Professor Cunningham's client's story for fear that my
translation would be an inaccurate oversimplification. Nevertheless, in brief, Mr. Johnson
was stopped by police for a traffic violation, which he denied committing, and was then
searched for a weapon. See Cunningham, supra note 100, at 1309-11. When he objected to
the officers' treatment of him, he was arrested for disorderly conduct. See id.
102. See id. at 1309.
103. See id. at 1324-26; see also infra Part IllB, which discusses the problem of factual
context.
104. See Cunningham, supra note 100, at 1324-26.
105. See id. at 1381-82.
106. See id.
1998]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
resisted being treated like a teen-ager by a white police officer. 7
Neither the Terry- pretext framework nor most other conceivable
legal frameworks encompasses Mr. Johnson's view of the case. In
the final analysis, although under traditional legal principles Mr.
Johnson "won,"'0 8 Mr. Johnson was unhappy with the outcome
because his perspective and voice were squelched by the legal
framework. 9
The framework problem identified by Professors Finley and
Cunningham begins in first-year legal writing, because legal writing
teaches students to frame issues in a way that demonstrates mastery
of existing legal language. The process view requires a framework
that the legal audience will understand and find persuasive; the
social view teaches students to demonstrate expertise in legal
language by learning and using the traditional frameworks."0
Together, the two views teach that students, like lawyers, are
limited not only by stare decisis, which encourages them to look to
existing law to argue even novel legal questions, but also by the
ways that law categorizes certain problems."' Thus, the dilemma
of "translation" described by Professor Cunningham results, in part,
from the effectiveness of the social and process views of legal
writing, which strive to teach students to perform that translation
and communicate it in writing.
Legal writing courses teach students to frame legal questions
primarily through legal writing assignments. In memorandum
writing, students must predict the outcome of a case by analyzing
how a body of law applies to hypothetical facts.112 Whether the
107. See id. at 1324-25.
108. The case was dismissed by the prosecutor.
109. See Cunningham, supra note 100, at 1329-30. It is perhaps true that complete
satisfaction and happiness is not possible for clients within our legal system--or should not
even be the goal. But perhaps it should be a greater part of the goal than it is now.
Otherwise, what are lawyers really giving to their clients?
110. See EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 244-46 (describing how to tailor legal arguments
to judicial audience); NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 254, 260 (developing and testing theory
of the case); PRATT, supra note 39, at 86-87 (analyzing legal problem and isolating issues).
111. See Finley, supra note 2, at 904. Professor Finley notes that, "[t]he law has a hard
time hearing, or believing, other languages. That is part of its power." Id. at 903 (describing
how the testimony of labor historian Alice Kessler-Harris was ridiculed at trial in part
because of Kessler-Harris' failure to speak in "reductionist" legal terms).
112. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 28-29; Jan M. Levine et al., AnalyticalAssign-
ments for Integrating Legal Research and Writing (1996-97 ed.) (collection of legal writing
assignments formerly published by Adams & Ambrose Publishing) [hereinafter Analytical
Assignments].
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memorandum assignment specifies the legal framework, as is
frequently done, or requires the students to issue spot, one of the
primary goals is for the student to recognize and understand how
the facts fit into the legal framework. 3 Both the process and
social views of legal writing require teaching students to adhere to
the issue or framework assigned; the process view emphasizes that
the legal audience expects an answer to a particular legal question
and the social view emphasizes that only novices to legal language
and culture stray from the precise issue. 4
In advocacy writing, the legal writing assignments are designed
to teach students to analyze a set of hypothetical facts and develop
a "theory of the case" and argument framework that will persuade
a court to rule in their client's favor. Consistent with the focus on
audience and context, legal writing teaches explicitly that the most
persuasive theories and frameworks are those that judges will
"buy.", 115 As legal writing texts correctly point out, judges usually
do not like doing things that are very novel without any legal
authority-that is the nature of the legal system and of stare
decisis. 116 Indeed, as lawyers not only assimilated to but also
successful at the language and culture of the law, judges and other
powerful audience members will be persuaded by arguments that
use legal language, not those that reject it." 7 Thus, legal writing
teaches that the most persuasive frameworks and theories tend to
be those that are most mainstream. As one legal writing text
states:
113. See Analytical Assignments, supra note 112.
114. See NANCY L. SCHULTZ & Louis J. SIRICO, JR., LEGAL WRITING AND OTHER
LAWYERING SKILLS 165, 167 (3d ed. 1998).
115. Some legal writing texts explicitly describe judges as consumers of ideas. See
EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 244-45; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 260.
116. See Finley, supra note 2, at 890; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 260 (noting that in
developing a theory of the case, a judge "like any other kind of consumer... buys only
when struck with a feeling of confidence that the purchase will turn out well, without causing
injustice or embarrassment on appeal or before the public."); see also Little, supra note 12,
at 394 (noting that when the audience is not strongly iconoclastic, the advocate benefits by
the force of convention). Most successful lawyers and judges are most susceptible to
arguments within frameworks with which they are familiar. To make a truly novel argument
is to take a risk. See Little, supra note 12, at 394. Professor Little points out that in the
advocacy context, the advocate is more likely to succeed (although not always) with her
audience if the advocate "start[s] with widely accepted notions." Id.
117. Cf. Janoff, supra note 83, at 238 (studying the power of the first year of law school
to assimilate people into culture of law).
1998]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Lawyers as a group tend to be personally conservative (though
not necessarily politically so). This is particularly true of judges.
Because of the public nature of their job and the fact that they
are seen as safeguarders of public morality, lawyers who
become judges tend to be conservative in their personal
lifestyle. 18
Relatedly, because it is also part of legal writing courses to
teach stare decisis and application of legal rules, the assigned
framework will almost always be one that reflects existing law. As
a result, it will also reflect the law's biases and hierarchies."9
Thus, legal writing contributes to the creation of lawyers afflicted
with the legal tunnel vision described by Professor Cunningham in
his representation of Mr. Johnson.12° Although it was arguably
the most effective framework, Professor Cunningham did not have
to frame the question as an illegal Terry stop. However, he could
only go "outside the box" at great risk to his client and his
professional reputation. In addition, the available legal frameworks
rarely encompass ideas like the special circumstances that race
might play in an area of law that is not explicitly centered around
race issues, such as Fourth Amendment law. 2'
For example, consider a student assigned to write a brief and
confronted with a fact pattern similar to Dujon Johnson's experi-
ence with the Michigan police. In part because of its emphasis on
reaching one's audience, legal writing would encourage and reward
students who successfully recognized the case as an illegal Terry
stop and pretext arrest, because this is likely to be how a judge
would see the case as well. The same emphasis on audience would
discourage an outsider law student, even one personally familiar
with white police officers' treatment of people of color, from
framing the case to reflect his outsider viewpoint. The process
view's focus on audience, combined with the inherent conservatism
of the law and stare decisis, would require the student to consider
whether the court would "hear" an argument framed (i) to reflect
118. See EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 245.
119. This point is demonstrated by the significant amount of space in legal writing texts
devoted to rules, holdings, and precedent. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 15-27;
NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 15-25, 127-133; SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114, at 9-14.
120. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
121. That is, an area of law that purports and appears to be not about race and within
which race is not "central" as a matter of law, unlike, for example, race discrimination law.
See Cunningham, supra note 100, at 1370-71.
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directly the view that race was central to the case and (ii) to reflect
the goal of restoration of Mr. Johnson's dignity.
The answer is that a court probably would not "hear" either
framework. Specifically, part of Professor Cunningham's point is
that such a framework does not really exist in legal language.
Because an attempt to create a novel framework would risk
alienating the audience, legal writing pedagogy would counsel
against it. Certainly, no existing legal framework permits a lawyer
to change the goal in a criminal case; the law prescribes that the
goal of the defendant, and thereby his lawyer, is the avoidance of
conviction, not the restoration of dignity.22 Moreover, legal
writing pedagogy, in teaching students about the legal context and
legal audience, would likely encourage a framework that appeals to
judges' inherent conservatism. Because the law purports to be
"neutral", those heavily invested in the law, like judges, can
become angry at a lawyer or client who makes a bias argument in
a case involving "neutral" law. 23 So, even if the legal writing
professor is familiar with and gives a brief explanation of potential
biases in the law, the focus on the audience requires that the
student put aside critical jurisprudence and develop a theory and
framework that will be most attractive to a mainstream audi-
ence.'24 Thus, legal writing, by acceding to the law's framing of
122. See Finley, supra note 2, at 899, 902-03 (noting that the law's framework of simple
dichotomies such as guilty/not guilty frame conflicts and exclude complex reality). The
framework is hardly debatable; one wonders whether, under a traditional interpretation of
the rules of professional ethics, arguments that serve the restoration of dignity at the expense
of the client's liberty might amount to legal malpractice. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSION-
AL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101-02 (1980) (mandating that a lawyer must not fail to represent
a client zealously within the bounds of the law); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
Rule 1.3 (1983) (requiring diligence) and cmt. [1] (stating that a lawyer should pursue a
client's interests with commitment, dedication, and zeal in advocacy). If so, can the legal
writing professor teach anything but the "no conviction" framing of the arguments?
123. The judge in Mr. Johnson's case not only became irritated, but directed his irritation
at Mr. Johnson. To the extent Professor Cunningham tried to make race-based arguments,
the judge disregarded them and characterized Mr. Johnson as a person with "a chip on his
shoulder" who was "hollering racism." Cunningham, supra note 100, at 1370, 1376-77.
Given the judge's irritation at Professor Cunningham's attempt to inject race into the legal
proceedings, one can infer that the judge would have been less than open to a framework
that had racial harassment at its center. See id. at 1320-21, 1377-78.
124. Of course, a professional, experienced legal writing professor would likely encourage
students to emphasize the disrespectful nature of the officers' conduct and point out the race
issues in the "Facts" section of the brief or memorandum, but it is unlikely that these facts,
regardless of importance to the client or the writer, could form the framework of the issue
or the basis of a legal argument for avoiding conviction without distorting them or losing the
audience.
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the debate and prescription of the goals, because these are the most
likely to reach the audience, makes the unique concerns of the
outsider student and client voiceless.1
25
Indeed, for the outsider student, the harm is more compound
than voicelessness. Legal writing requires the student to speak in
the law's voice-silence is not an option. The methodology of legal
writing, which requires a number of critiqued drafts and individual
feedback, ensures that by the final draft of a legal document, the
student will frame the question to reach the audience and write it
to convince the audience. More important, however, is that the
student will have internalized the perspective of the legal audi-
ence-indeed, this is a primary goal of the process view.1 26 Thus,
once legal writing teaches the student the perspective of the legal
audience and how to frame the issues in a way consistent with that
audience, it is unlikely that the student will be able to step outside
the legal framework, and use his or her "pre-lawyer" outsider voice
to address legal issues.
127
B. The Problem of Emphasis on Context in Use of Facts
Related to the problem of framework is the problem of factual
context, because the issue or framework determines which facts are
relevant. In addition to teaching how to frame an issue, legal
writing also teaches students to take the framework, research the
appropriate law, and apply the law to the client's facts.'28 Inher-
ent in teaching the application of law is the teaching of two skills
related to facts: (i) how to identify outcome determinative facts in
judicial opinions-those facts which are legally relevant and
determine how a given rule is applied and the outcome of a
case 129 and (ii) how to use the reasoning in judicial opinions to
determine which facts from the client's story are outcome determi-
125. See Cunningham, supra note 100, at 1387. In his final letter to Professor Cunning-
ham, Dujon Johnson writes, "To be voiceless was the greatest pain of all." Id. Of course,
the way that the American legal system is set up, we must be more concerned about our
clients' loss of voice than our students', but part of Professor Cunningham's point is that the
myopia of the law-and the resultant myopia of lawyers-does a disservice to our clients.
126. See Kearney & Beazley, supra note 40, at 900-01; Meyer, supra note 91, at 792.
127. Janoff, supra note 83, at 236-38.
128. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 32.
129. See id. at 176-77; Jethro Lieberman, presentation at the Legal Writing Institute
Confernce (June 19, 1998) (entitled The Art of the Fact, publication forthcoming in 5 J.
LEGAL WRITING).
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native.13 ° In their discussion of case law in a memorandum, for
example, students must generally stick to the facts that a court
found important in its reasoning and determine the outcome of
their client's case by comparing the relevant facts from precedent
to their client's facts. Similarly, students learn to cull the relevant
facts of their client's story from legal documents provided in the
assignment; for the most part, students learn to incorporate the
relevant facts into the "Facts" section of the legal memorandum,
and leave out facts that are not legally relevant.' In teaching
these crucial fact skills, however, legal writing may contribute to
the alienation of outsider law students because it teaches students
to accept a court's finding of outcome determinative facts.
Frequently, however, a court's perspective on which facts are
outcome determinative may be biased.'
Professor Margaret Montoya tells a story about her first year
of law school that illustrates the dilemma of the outsider forced to
accept a court's decision about outcome determinative facts. 33
Professor Montoya remembers that the only Latina she encoun-
tered in a case in her first year of law school was Josephine
Chavez, a young woman charged with manslaughter based on her
having given birth in a toilet in her family's home and having
hidden the baby under the bathtub.34 Professor Montoya re-
counts that the appellate opinion focused on the "legal person-
hood" of the dead baby, also touching on issues of criminal intent,
mens rea, and diminished capacity; however, little cultural or
130. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 176, 258-62.
131. It is true that the better legal writing texts and courses teach students to skillfully
use facts that are not strictly relevant. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 184 (1996);
NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 176. But, these facts still do not fall into that special category
of legal relevance-they are peripheral, not "outcome determinative."
132. See Montoya, Trenzas, supra note 14, at 201-08.
133. See id. at 201. This problem is intricately connected to the problem of the sanctity
of audience in legal writing and the problem of framework. The Dujon case is also an
excellent illustration of the "bias" of outcome determinative facts. See Cunningham, supra
note 100, at 1324-26; see also Getman, supra note 91, at 583. Professor Getman tells a story
of a class discussion of State v. Williams, in which an American Indian couple is convicted
of negligent homicide for failing to bring their baby to a doctor when he became seriously
ill. An African-American student in the class interjected facts not stated in the opinion
about why black people "often avoid doctors." The student interjected facts that the court
did not even mention, much less find relevant, but the facts enhanced understanding of the
case. See id.
134. See Montoya, Trenzas, supra note 14, at 201.
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gender related information is discussed.'35 Missing, Professor
Montoya argues, are the following questions:
What did it take to conceal [Josephine Chavez's] pregnancy
from her familia? With whom did she share her secret? How
could she have given birth with "the doors open and no
lights ... turned on?" How did she do so without waking the
others who were asleep?' How did she brace herself as she
delivered the baby ... ?136
Also missing are the key Latina cultural elements of verguenza
("shame") that would begin to explain Josephine Chavez's
desperation to conceal her pregnancy from her family, because her
pregnancy, proof positive of her sexuality, would be viewed by her
family as a lack of respeto for the family.'37 None of this appears
in the opinion, however, because such information is inconsistent
with "traditional legal discourse.' ' 138 The silence of the judicial
opinion on the facts that mattered to Professor Montoya, and, she
argues, probably mattered to others who identified with Josephine
Chavez's poverty, gender, or ethnicity, "invalidate" as irrelevant the
culture of these outsiders.139
The alienation described by Professor Montoya occurs
frequently and acutely in legal writing courses, because legal writing
pedagogy places a premium on a student's ability to recognize,
understand, and apply those facts a court has determined to be
relevant and because legal writing courses require that students
write their conclusions. Identifying outcome determinative facts
and using them in a legal context is a part of legal language that
separates novices from beginners, and is therefore a critical part of
the social view's emphasis on immersion in the discourse communi-
ty. Fact skills also are important to the concept of audience, both
because use of outcome determinative facts is necessary to reach
and persuade a legal audience, and because use of irrelevant facts
135. See id. at 203. Here again it is apparent how the legal framework determined the
relevant facts. See id. at 204.
136. See id. at 203 (footnotes omitted).
137. See id. at 205. Professor Montoya frequently uses Spanish words when they have
a special cultural meaning that cannot be conveyed in English. To remain as true as possible
to Professor Montoya's meaning, and because one of the main points of this Article is how
culture can be lost in translation, I use the Spanish here as well.
138. See id. at 204; Finley, supra note 2, at 897 (discussing that experience and
perspective translate as bias in legal discourse).
139. See Montoya, Trenzas, supra note 14, at 205.
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will be distracting and annoying to the busy lawyer or judge who
is the audience of legal documents.14
Methodologically, legal writing teaches these skills through
writing assignments and through written and oral critique on
student drafts. Typically, a legal writing memorandum assignment
gives students a hypothetical fact scenario and requires students to
write a Question Presented, Brief Answer, Statement of Facts, and
a Discussion. A primary goal of legal writing is to teach students
to select and use only outcome determinative facts in most sections
of the memorandum and to use "background" facts in the State-
ment of Facts only to the extent that they clarify the outcome
determinative facts. Thus, legal writing texts caution students that
in writing the Statement of Facts:
[Y]our busy law trained reader will want to know only two
kinds of facts: (1) facts relevant to the question presented and
(2) background facts necessary to provide context for these
legally significant facts.141
Similarly, in the Discussion section, a principal goal of legal writing
pedagogy is to teach students to resolve the hypothetical dispute by
analogizing the facts of the hypothetical with the outcome determi-
native facts of precedent cases.14 2 To master these skills, students
must learn to recognize relevant facts in judicial opinions, use
opinions to determine which of the client's facts are relevant, and
resolve the dispute by analogizing and distinguishing. 43
To learn to select facts carefully and avoid cluttering a legal
document with irrelevant facts, legal writing courses instruct
students to locate outcome determinative facts by carefully
examining a court's recitation of the facts of a dispute and the
court's reasoning." Students are taught to ask themselves "if a
particular fact had not happened, or if it had happened differently,
would the court have made a different decision?" '145 In addition,
the process pedagogy teaches fact skills by critiquing students' use
of facts in their drafts. For example, a common student error is to
140. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 183-84; SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114,
at 181.
141. EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 183-84.
142. See id. at 103-105; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 130.
143. See EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 103-105; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 130.
144. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 183-84; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 176;
SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114, at 181.
145. NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 176.
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include legally irrelevant facts when discussing the facts of the case
or in the Statement of Facts. The legal writing professor might
correct this by questioning the student's decision, asking in the
margin: why did you include these facts from precedent case X in
the memorandum? Are they relevant to the outcome of the
dispute? It is common for legal writing professors to question why
students included-or did not include-facts in the "Facts" section
of the memorandum or brief. The goal is for the student to
internalize the concept of relevance and to learn to use facts as a
lawyer would.
However, outsider students may respond to the questions of
relevance with frustration because the court's decision about what
facts are outcome determinative seems biased and does not reflect
the student's experiences or knowledge. In those situations,
outsider students are faced with a wide gap between the profession-
al and the personal-legal writing requires that they use facts as the
court did even though this conflicts with their personal understand-
ing. Moreover, the legal writing professor is faced with the
dilemma of correcting the student's use of facts that a court did not
find relevant (and thereby suppressing the student's experience and
voice) or allowing the student to "misread" or "misapply" the case.
For example, legal writing pedagogy, because it emphasizes
fluency in legal language and discourse, would discourage a law
student asked to analyze the facts presented in the Chavez case
from incorporating facts related to verguenza or respeto into the
analysis. Legal writing pedagogy's emphasis on audience and legal
convention would require that the legal writing student write the
memorandum or brief at least in part accepting the outcome
determinative facts in precedent cases, and accepting the legal
irrelevance of the facts related to verguenza or sexuality. Thus,
legal writing pedagogy rewards those students for whom the facts
deemed relevant by the court make sense, and attempts to
"correct" those students who cannot understand the court's choice
of outcome determinative facts. Moreover, because it is one of the
goals of legal writing to teach the crucial skills of recognizing
outcome determinative facts, and because of the short amount of
time most legal writing courses are awarded, it is unlikely that most
legal writing professors would be able to have a discussion about
the potential bias in a court's determination of relevant facts. Even
if the professor had the time to acknowledge a court's failure to
recognize certain facts related to culture, ethnicity, gender, or
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sexual orientation, legal convention and audience requires that the
final, written product focus on the facts that the court determined
were relevant.
Legal writing, unlike most doctrinal courses, requires students
to use outcome determinative facts actively in analysis and writing.
The classroom experience of Professor Montoya involved only the
reading and discussion of the Chavez case. Legal writing involves
the far more personal act of writing-in the epistemic view, the act
of constructing law. In addition, the process method means that
the legal writing professor would analyze and critique the student's
drafts to ensure not only that the student used only relevant facts
in that document, but to indoctrinate the student with the concept
of relevance as defined by legal language; a concept that frequently
does not include the perspectives of outsider cultures or races.
Teaching students to internalize the labels of "relevant" and
"irrelevant" as attached to certain facts requires outsider students
to accept, use actively the law's value judgments and myopia about
their own culture, gender, or sexual orientation. The students must
acknowledge and write as though their realities and perspectives
are "irrelevant" and not worthy to be included in legal analysis. In
addition to causing individual pain for outsider students, the
method of teaching these skills perpetuates the law's myopia and
bias-under the epistemic or determinist views, it "creates" or
"constructs" law that excludes certain viewpoints.
C. Teaching "Objective" Writing And the "I"
A corollary to the problem of audience, the requirement of
"objectivity" in legal writing is another predicament for outsider
law students. In most legal writing courses, a full semester is
devoted to teaching objective or predictive writing.146 Writing
legal memoranda is termed "objective" to distinguish it from the
other primary category of legal writing, advocacy writing, which has
an explicit perspective and agenda.'47 Legal writing teaches
objective analysis and writing, in part, because objectivity is a
hallmark of legal language, of the professional voice.148  In
146. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
147. See EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 2-3; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 52.
148. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 2, at 897-98; Getman, supra note 91, at 578 (contending
that the professional voice and its rules, "stated in generalities that apply regardless of the
persons involved, permit the legal system to avoid prejudice and to transcend invidious
distinctions.").
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objective writing, the task of the lawyer is to identify the legal
issue, analyze the law, apply it to the facts of a given case, and give
a professional opinion about how the law resolves the case.149
The writer's professional opinion should be unaffected by the
desires of the client; if the writer believes that, on balance, the law
resolves the matter in a way unfavorable to the client, that is what
the writer must say in the memorandum. 5 ° Hence, the memoran-
dum is "objective" in the sense that it requires the writer to
approach the law through the lens of neutrality, not as an advocate
for one side. Objective writing is also frequently referred to as
predictive writing, because a main purpose of it is to communicate
the writer's prediction of the outcome of the case. 5'
Objective writing causes several problems for the outsider legal
writer. First, outsider writers may feel alienated from the substance
of the law that they are required to report as their "opinion," which
widens the gap between their personal and professional voices.'52
The gap is widened further by the fiction that judicial opinions are
objective and neutral, and therefore represent the writer's profes-
sional, not personal, voice. To many outsider law students, judicial
opinions seem biased in a racial, ethnic, sexist, or heterocentric
way, yet legal writing and lawyering require them to use the law
without considering the hidden bias. In addition, the alienation is
compounded by the requirement that the conventions of legal
writing require that the writer's opinion be expressed without the
use of the first person pronoun.153 For outsider writers, who may
already feel like their "I" is not a part of the law, the banishment
of the explicit "I" from a document purporting to represent the
writers' opinion means that these writers are further divorced from
the document and from their professional voices.
Many first-year law students bristle at the notion that the
memorandum reflects their "opinion" because of the disparity
149. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 67-68, 77; SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114, at
168.
150. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 84; SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114, at 168.
151. See EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 2-3; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 77.
152. I realize that because the underlying premise in this section is alienation from the
substance and reasoning of the law, this section overlaps significantly with the previous
discussions of framework and relevance. I believe, however, that the added requirement of
objectivity in memorandum writing (and reasoning and speaking in the law) superimposes
a new layer to the problem that merits separate attention. See supra Parts III.A and B.
153. See EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 219; HELENE S. SHAPO et al., WRITING AND
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 1, 73-74 (3d ed. 1995).
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between their personal experiences and the reasoning or outcome
of the cases. Indeed, the memorandum of law requires some
personal input, but its bottom line is the accurate communication
of the relevant court opinions and their application to the facts.
54
The separation of personal opinion and professional opinion may
not be great if the writer agrees with or identifies with the rules
and reasoning of the law. But when the writer's experiences run
counter to the reasoning of a case, or when the writer cannot
identify with the "rightness" of a rule or rationale, or worse, finds
it repugnant to her personal values, the gap between the personal
and professional becomes wide, and requires an uncomfortable
perspective shift.'55 This gap between personal and professional
voice is a particular problem for outsider law students and lawyers,
because the foundation for legal language and reasoning is the
experiences of the "dominant group," which has the luxury of
terming its members' experiences and perspectives "objective" and
pushing aside other experiences and perspectives as outside the
norm.
1 56
In legal writing, the outsider writer's discomfort may be
exacerbated by the highly personal nature of writing-students
have described feelings of hypocrisy and betrayal of personal mores
when forced to write something that purports to be their profes-
sional opinion, but really is not their personal opinion.1 57  In
addition, the existence of a wide gap between personal and
professional opinion means that the part of the writer's identity
that causes the gap is not "professional" and has no place in the
law. When that part of the writer's identity is the writer's outsider
154. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 89-91; SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114, at 138-
39, 168-69.
155. See Montoya, Borderlands, supra note 100, at 422-24; Lani Guinier et al., Becoming
Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 42-43
(1994); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurispruden-
tial Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297, 298 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Quail Calls];
Weiss & Melling, supra note 17, at 1307, 1314-20. Some scholars label this the gap between
professional and "human" voice. See Getman, supra note 91, at 582; Hodges, supra note 91,
at 634-35.
156. See Finley, supra note 2, at 893-94; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM,
MARXISM, METHOD AND THE STATE: TOWARD A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 8 SIGNS 635
(1983) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM, MARXISM, METHOD AND THE STATE];
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 74, at 237-38.
157. Several students have expressed to me that the requirement that they write the
"false" opinion down and present it as their opinion makes it that much more difficult. See
also Weiss & Melling, supra note 17, at 1352.
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status, whether race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation, the
outsider status is what is devalued-it is that part of the writer's "I"
that is expunged. The teaching of objective writing exacerbates this
because it teaches that the information that belongs in the
memorandum is professional and therefore, valued. This means
that any other opinions are devalued, and the experiences on which
the opinions are based are not the norm.158 The social method
of acculturation contributes to this by imposing, and therefore
valuing, the existing legal language and culture and expunging, and
therefore devaluing, any competing language and cultures.
Moreover, the process method, which places a high value on the
professor's early and consistent "intervention" into a student's
writing process, adds to the coercion to conform.
A good example of the "alienation" problem raised by
objective writing is a discussion I had with one of my first-year
students, who I will call "Kim." '159 Kim was struggling with the
first memorandum problem, which involved an adult male survivor
of child sexual abuse who repressed the memory of the abuse and
remembered it twenty years after its occurrence.16 Having
recollected the abuse, the survivor wished to sue the abuser civilly.
The issue was whether the discovery rule would toll the statute of
limitations for tort actions based on the repressed memory of the
victim. Both parties lived in Pennsylvania, and the abuse occurred
in Pennsylvania, so Pennsylvania law applied. Pennsylvania law is
clear: the discovery rule will not toll for mental incapacity, and the
courts unanimously categorize repressed memory as a form of
mental incapacity. 6'
During our conference on her first draft, Kim told me that she
was very uncomfortable with not only the result required by
Pennsylvania law, but with the courts' reasoning. She especially
took issue with the implication in some of the opinions that
158. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 218 (suggesting to avoid personal references
entirely unless they are legally relevant); SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114, at 139 ("A
judge or senior attorney may not care about your personal opinion.").
159. I gathered the anecdotal data that appears throughout this paper in two ways: (1)
by taking extensive notes after student conferences, (2) and by interviewing former students
of legal research and writing. For privacy reasons, I use pseudonyms for all students.
Another example is a story told by Professor Philip Meyer about a student who adopted the
professional voice, but felt isolated and alienated by the process. See Meyer, supra note 91,
at 789-90.
160. This problem was adapted from Analytical Assignments, supra note 112.
161. See Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 170-71 (Pa. 1997).
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repressed memory was a mental defect of the victim and demon-
strated a lack of diligence on the part of the victim.162 She
politely challenged my assertion in class, and our textbook's
characterization, that the memorandum should represent her
professional opinion.1 63  Rather, she argued, the memorandum
required her to communicate someone else's opinion-one that was
substantively different from hers-and present it as "the objective
law" and her "professional" opinion. In addition, Kim felt that
communicating, especially in writing, law and reasoning that she
considered not only fallacious but also harmful, gave legitimacy to
it."6  She asked whether she could write the memorandum
communicating her actual, personal opinion about the fallacy of the
courts' reasoning and the unfairness of denying recovery.
I told Kim that she could take a short paragraph at the end of
the memorandum to express her personal opinion, but that the
purpose of the document and its intended audience required that
the bulk of it be devoted to communicating what the law was, not
what she believed it should be. Somewhat apologetically, I told her
that I empathized with her feelings and agreed with her, but the
bottom line was that her reader wanted to know the law, because
that is what would most likely determine the outcome for the
client.1 65 In the end, she turned in a very good memorandum that
162. See, e.g., Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd, 950 F.2d 721
(3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the victim stated in his deposition that he knew the sexual act was
wrong when it occurred). Baily also distinguishes repressed memory from traditional
discovery rule cases (e.g., the sponge left in the stomach, exposure to asbestos) on this
ground. See id. at 807.
163. We use the NEUMANN legal writing text. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 82.
164. Kim would get support for this opinion from the epistemic view of writing and from
determinism. See supra notes 29-31 and 62-64 and accompanying text.
165. There is, of course, the possibility of arguing that the court should overturn prece-
dent, but most lawyers would agree that this is an uphill battle. See supra Part III.A. In the
problem assigned to Kim, there were several cases, including an opinion from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, all of which denied recovery and that significantly lowered the
probability of successfully arguing for an overruling of precedent. See Finley, supra note 2,
at 890 (noting that stare decisis means that arguments outside existing norms are "suspect
as radical, unthinkable, unexpressible, and unreachable by legal language."). In the
repressed memory context, therefore, the law has foreclosed not only the argument that an
adult who represses memory of a childhood sexual assault is acting reasonably, but has also
foreclosed the argument that "reasonableness" may be an inappropriate test. Even if one
had the tenacity and resources to make these arguments, they would have to be based on
something other than the subjective experience-they must use existing law and legal
frameworks. See supra Part III.A.
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succinctly analyzed the law and applied it to the facts, but con-
tained no reference to her personal feelings.
The problem of dissonance between personal and professional
voice is exacerbated by the law's disparagement of the subjective
and the veneration of the perspective of the "dominant group" as
neutral and objective. In legal writing, although the writer is
always expressing an opinion, the formality of the writing forbids
use of the pronoun "I" or any other reference to the writer's self
or subjective feelings."6 In addition to being too informal, legal
writing teaches that the explicit use of "I" is either "distracting
clutter" that calls undue attention to the writer 167 or redun-
dant-that the memorandum reflects the writer's opinion is implicit
in the purpose of predictive writing. 168  Thus, students are taught
to state their opinion in abstract, definitive terms.169  The idea
that the use of "I" is redundant or mere "distracting clutter"
assumes no disparity between personal and professional opinion-it
assumes that there is one "opinion" and it is reflected in the
definitive statement of what the law says.17' Even in those
limited circumstances in which it is appropriate in a legal memoran-
dum to criticize or disagree with the law, students still must do so
without using "I" or in any other way referring directly to their
personal experiences-because in legal discourse, experience and
perspective, the "I" translates as bias.171  The law student must
166. See SHAPO et al., supra note 153, at 73-74; EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 219. This
is part of the law's "register." See infra notes 191-217 and accompanying text.
167. See EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 218-19; NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 402; SCHULTZ
& SIRICO, supra note 114, at 139.
168. Most of the legal writing texts do not say this explicitly, but, especially in the explicit
requirement that students state "a conclusion," they certainly suggest that the memorandum
(and briefs) reflect the student's position or opinion about the law. See NEUMANN, supra
note 39, at 82 (noting that predictive writing requires you to "take a position"); SCHULTZ &
SIRICO, supra note 114, at 168 (noting that memorandum reflects "your position" and use
of "I" reminds the reader that you are making the arguments).
169. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 218-19; SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114,
at 139; SHAPO et al., supra note 153, at 74.
170. See Finley, supra note 2, at 892-93.
171. See id. at 897; SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 114, at 139 (using "I" weakens
argument by reminding the reader that you are making the arguments); VEDA R. CHARROW
et al., CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING 182-83 (2d ed. 1995) (arguing that analysis
is well-reasoned when it is, or at least appears, impersonal); EDWARDS, supra note 39, at 219
(noting that even when a personal reference is relevant, writer should not use "I"). That
perspective means bias is not necessarily true, even though many treat it as an absolute truth
in the law. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 983
(1991) (explaining that Susan Estrich used her personal rape story to establish her interest
in and her unique authority to speak on the subject of rape).
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write "the statute of limitations has expired," not "I believe that
the statute of limitations has expired;" or, "the reasoning in the
precedent cases does not apply to the current case" not "I believe
that the court's conclusion is wrong because my personal experi-
ence tells me that the reasoning is faulty. 17
2
For the outsider writer, the problem with the requirement of
stating the conclusion in abstract terms and prohibiting reference
to the self is that it highlights the distance between the writer's
personal and professional voices and contributes to the writer's
already burgeoning sense of alienation from the law and from legal
writing.173  For writers who are more comfortable with the
reasoning and language of the law, who find that their personal
experiences are reflected accurately in legal reasoning, it may be
fair to say that the "I" is implied in a firm statement of the
conclusion. But for writers, like Kim, who cannot identify with the
law, whose experiences are not reflected, and for whom legal
rationales seem "false," there is no implied "I." Post-modern
linguists and semiologists theorize that the use of the word "I"
actually "calls the speaker into existence"-it is a way of defeating
invisibility., 174  By prohibiting its use, legal writing contributes to
the invisibility of outsider law students and, in determinist terms,
contributes to the suppression of their "existence" in the language
of the law.
175
D. The Vocabulary and Register of Legal Language Is Biased
In addition to framework, relevance, and objectivity, the basic
vocabulary and register of legal language can mute outsider voices.
In linguistic theory, the "register" of language is the institutional
style of a particular language, such as use of the passive voice and
172. See SHAPO et al., supra note 153, at 74; CHARROW et al., supra note 171, at 183.
173. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 161, 172 (discussing post-modern theories of Luce
Irigaray).
174. Id. at 161. The use of the "I" is especially important for those who are already
invisible in society-post-modern scholars have argued that the "I" is necessary to represent
oneself as a "linguistic subject." Id. at 172 (quoting Luce Irigaray, L'orde sexuel du discours,
LANGAGES 123 (Vol. 85, 1987)). Outsider writers--especially feminist writers-were the
groundbreakers in the production of narrative legal scholarship. In part, they did this to
make their "Is" visible and heard. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 171, at 975; Angel, supra
note 17, at 232-34.
175. See Finley, supra note 2, at 896-977. Professor Finley states that the law's "language
of neutrality and objectivity can silence the voices of those who did not participate in its
creation because it takes a distanced, decontextualized stance." Id. at 897.
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Latin in science writing.17 6  Legal writing, exemplified by the
social view, strives to immerse students in the vocabulary and
register of the law to make them fluent speakers.177 As a result,
students who need to express outsider concepts must use a
vocabulary and register that may not encompass these concepts.
The "translation" into legal terms and vocabulary can result in
muting by altering the concept or by discouraging expression of it.
By immersing students in the vocabulary of the law, legal
writing may subtly limit the way students think about legal
problems. Words and their meanings can reflect cultural and
gender bias. 78 Professor Lucinda Finley gives the example of the
word "work," which in the context of labor law means something
that is done for wages outside the home.'79 Thus, to be effective,
any attempt to reform labor law, for example, to include the
concept of what women do in the home must use the vocabulary of
labor law, including labor law's definition of the term "work."
However, the definition of that term contains gender biases that go
to the heart of the very reform to be accomplished. 8 ' Other
examples are definitions of the words "parent" and "family" in
family law that generally exclude the idea of a lesbian or gay
couple with a child.' Even in those states in which courts have
construed narrow statutory language to include gay and lesbian
176. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 197-98. The term "register" differs from discourse
in that register refers to the formal features (one cannot use "I") and discourse goes beyond
the formal into the ideological (the absence of "I" reflects the ideology of law as objective
and impersonal). See id.
177. See Stanchi, supra note 6, at 2-3; see also supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
178. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 197.
179. See Finley, supra note 2, at 898.
180. See id.
181. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997) ("No person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4
(1997) ("[A]ny individual not a minor and not a homosexual may adopt"). But see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34-11B-3 (West 1997) ('Parent' means a person who is the biological parent,
adoptive parent, foster parent, step parent, parent-in-law, or legal guardian, having a
'parent-child relationship' with a child as defined by law, or having sole or joint legal or
physical custody, care, guardianship, or visitation with a child."); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279
Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that there is "nothing in [our] statutory
provisions that would preclude a child from being jointly adopted by someone of the same
sex as the natural parent"); In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d
550, 554-55 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) ("We cannot continue to pretend that there is one
formula, one correct pattern that should constitute a family in order to achieve the
supporting, loving environment we believe children should have."); see also generally Joseph
G. Arsenault, Comment, 'Family' But Not 'Parent': The Same Sex Coupling Jurisprudence
of the New York Court of Appeals, 58 ALB. L. REV. 813 (1995).
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families, the contortions required to include those families in the
legislative definition mark the concept as unusual or deviant.'82
In legal writing, students must struggle with the limitations of
legal vocabulary, but in the end must use the vocabulary or work
around it. For example, one of the first assignments in my legal
writing class at Temple asks students to write a short memorandum
about whether a lesbian has standing to sue for partial custody of
her lover's biological child in Pennsylvania. 83 Students confront
(as I did in the last sentence) the problem of what to call their
client, the person who wishes to sue for partial custody. This is
more than just a semantic problem; in the custody context, as in
many other legal contexts, how a person is described or character-
ized can affect the outcome of a case. In the fact pattern, the client
is not biologically related to the child and has no legal relationship
with the child, such as adoptive or step-parent.1 However, the
client stays at home full-time to take care of the child, who calls
her "mommy," while the biological mother works to support the
family financially.
The process method focus on audience requires students to use
words precisely, so as to communicate with their audience, a lawyer
who may not be familiar with the facts. The social method
reinforces the importance of precision, requiring students to use
legal vocabulary carefully and accurately. This usually requires that
the word chosen be used consistently with its widely-held legal or
English meaning, which in turn usually means the traditional and
conventional definition. The focus on audience means that the
writer without vocabulary to express an outsider concept is not free
to stretch the meaning of traditional words or to make up new
words. In other words, the writer wishing to express an outsider
concept is muted.
Thus, in the custody assignment, students struggling to describe
their client eventually reject the words "parent" and "mother"
because both words have narrow meanings, in English and in law
182. Compare Alison D. v. Virginia M. (In the Matter of Alison D.), 77 N.Y.2d 651
(1991), with J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). The very fact that, to be
clear, I must use the modifier "gay" or "lesbian" before the word "family" is an indication
that legal language marks the concept as unusual.
183. This problem was created and written by my colleague, Professor Elena Margolis.
184. Indeed, many states prohibit such a relationship by forbidding adoption by gay
people and by refusing to recognize gay marriage (foreclosing the legal step-parent path).
See supra note 181.
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that strongly imply a biological relationship. Although the terms
can connote a legal relationship, the existence of the modifiers
"adoptive" and "step" indicate that unmodified, "parent" and
"mother" mean biological. Thus, even though students argue that
the client should be (and is, by the child) referred to as both
"parent" and "mother," these terms eventually must be rejected
because the client does not fall within the widely-held, conventional
definition and use of either term to describe her could easily
mislead the audience of the document.185 On the other hand, the
legal term "third party," sometimes used to connote someone who
requests custody and is not a legal or biological parent,186 does
not really do justice to the client's relationship with the child. 187
Thus, although students may see the bias in legal language, they are
muted by the combination of the conventional, cultural limits of
vocabulary and the need to reach the audience.
The problem of indoctrination into legal vocabulary is
especially acute in legal writing because of its goals and methodolo-
gies. Both the process and social views of legal writing have as
their goals to make students fluent in legal language and to help
students develop a professional, legal voice. Legal writing
accomplishes this by immersing students in the vocabulary of the
law. The methodology of legal writing requires students not only
to learn the vocabulary, but to use it actively in writing, speaking,
and analyzing. Students write several drafts of memoranda and
briefs in which they must use the legal vocabulary actively and
correctly. The frequent critiques and individual conferences are
directed, in part, toward helping the students to internalize the
correct meanings of words, the correct context for the use of those
words, and the process of discovering the meanings and correct
context of legal vocabulary in the future. The social view especially
places great emphasis on learning more than the dictionary
meaning of the vocabulary and aims to teach the meaning of words
in the broader context of law and legal practice. Quite simply, in
185. They also tend to make the legal issue sound nonsensical. Imagine a question
presented that reads "Can a mother sue for partial custody of her lover's biological child?"
186. See, e.g., J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
187. This is only a partial list of words that could describe the client. In the end, though,
most of the descriptions one can come up with are either a bit off-the-mark ("domestic
partner," which emphasizes the relationship with the biological mother, not quite appropriate
in this context), or wordy and clumsy ("person with a parent-like relationship"). Similarly,
"primary caretaker" gets the students a little closer, but still does not convey the full
meaning of the relationship-it implies someone like a hired nanny or au pair.
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legal writing, escaping from learning and using legal language is
difficult. In part, that is what makes legal writing so effective at
teaching students to lawyer. But that effectiveness comes at the
expense of perpetuating the bias inherent in legal vocabulary and
alienating outsider students.
Teaching fluency in a vocabulary containing subtle social and
ideological messages has both micro and macro consequences. By
having fluency as its goal, legal writing teaches not only the
vocabulary, but by necessity, the social message as well. On a
micro level, legal writing inflicts an injury on the outsider law
student who sees that her "work" or "family" is excluded or
considered deviant by the law.188 On a macro level, as determin-
ist theory would predict, teaching fluency limits the law students'
and lawyers' world views and keeps the law stagnant.1 89 Once
fluent in the vocabulary, it is difficult not to adopt or "buy into"
the perspective reflected in the vocabulary.19° Thus, legal writ-
ing's focus on audience, and linguistic conservatism required by the
focus on audience, perpetuates in law and legal language the bias
that does not allow the lesbian who stays home and takes care of
her lover's child to be called "mother" or "parent" in a legal
document. And it reinforces the ideological message to students
that "mother" and "parent" encompass only a certain, traditional
concept and encourages bias against gay people.
There is no question that the cultural and ideological messages
imbedded in vocabulary are powerful and can alter a person's
perspective and beliefs. Linguist Deborah Cameron recounts the
story of a feminist writer who went to a defense policy think tank
to challenge the concepts of war and peace embraced by pro-
defense intellectuals.91 To talk to the pro-defense intellectuals
with credibility, the writer had to learn the language, including the
vocabulary.1" As a result of her fluency, she began to under-
stand and even share the viewpoint of the defense people she had
endeavored to criticize; once immersed in the language, she found
188. See, e.g., Montoya, Trenzas, supra note 14, at 205 (explaining outsiders' commisera-
tion with Chavez and its deviance in the legal community).
189. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
190. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 223; Finley, supra note 2, at 898.
191. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 223.
192. See id.
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it difficult to hold on to the anti-weapon proliferation perspective
that had brought her to the think tank in the first place.93
In the law school context, the Janoff study demonstrates that
the immersion process of the first year of law school can change
women students' reasoning processes from one that focuses on the
relationships between people to one that focuses on abstract
rights.'94 Although Janoff did not address the role of legal
vocabulary in altering students' reasoning, clearly vocabulary drives
the reasoning process, and teaching the meaning of legal terms such
as "equality, .... similarly situated," and "contract" can lead to the
development of a rights-oriented reasoning process.9 ' Because
legal writing has as its goal the development of students' profes-
sional legal voices and accomplishes this by requiring students to
use and internalize the meanings of legal words, legal writing
teaches students the political and ideological biases inherent in the
vocabulary.
Like learning vocabulary, novice speakers must learn the
"register" of a language to become fluent. The register of legal
language requires definitive, confident statements and conclusions,
both in writing and in speaking. 96 It requires writing and speak-
ing in abstract, objective rules.197 As part of its goal to teach
students fluency in legal language, legal writing courses teach
students how to speak and write in the legal register. For example,
part of legal writing pedagogy is to purge qualifying phrases such
as "maybe" and "it can be said" from student writing because in
legal language, such qualifiers connote weakness and uncertain-
193. See id.
194. See, e.g., Janoff, supra note 83, at 238. One of the tests used by Janoff was a
sentence completion test in which students were asked to complete various sentence
beginnings, such as "When people are helpless." Id. at 218 n.135. A care or relational
response is one marked by concern for others, such as: "When people are helpless, I try to
show them I care." Id. A rights oriented response focuses more on abstract obligation and
values, such as: "When people are helpless, society must step in and assist in rectifying some
of their problems." Id. at 223 n.146. The care oriented/rights oriented dichotomy in moral
reasoning was first described by Carol Gilligan. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1 (1982).
195. See Finley, supra note 2, at 898-99; Janoff, supra note 82, at 208-11.
196. See CHARROW et al., supra note 171, at 181 (asserting that students must avoid
qualifying language or "safety" words); NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 82 (noting that students
must avoid "waffling").
197. See supra notes 39 and 167 and accompanying text.
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ty.'98 Legal writing professors frequently strike qualifying phrases
from student drafts and design writing checklists to help students
edit qualifying language from their writing.199 Part of the purpose
of the critiques and the checklists is to help students internalize the
professional voice so that they can delete qualifying language from
future drafts.2°
Similarly, in oral advocacy, legal writing teaches students to
avoid speaking softly, rising intonation, and so-called tag questions
(the facts are clear, right?) at the end of sentences.2 ' Rather, the
preferred register for oral advocacy is to maintain eye-contact and
to speak loudly and declaratively.0 2 The advocate must project
certainty and confidence in writing and speech or risk losing her
credibility. Credibility is defined and maintained by a certain,
prescribed register. As one female law student described it:
Legal writing [places] a crazy value on curtness and posturing.
You make unsteady arguments seem sound because of how you
say them .... I got a sense that you were supposed to pare
away all the blurry edges and confusion to get to a core. Slam,
slam, to the conclusion.2"'
Consistent with the social view of learning in context, legal writing
teaches the professional, legal register by requiring students to
make an oral argument before a panel of judges who then critique
the students' argument technique. The panel of judges is generally
comprised of the legal writing professor and either other law
professors or alumni judges and practicing attorneys. Both the
classroom and textbook teaching of oral argument and the critique
that follows the students' first attempt is designed to teach students
to develop and use the professional, legal register.
The problem arises first because qualifying phrases, tag
questions, soft-spokenness, failure to maintain eye contact, and
rising intonation are features rarely found in the speech of the
198. See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 76, 198 (urging students to purge qualifying
"throat clearing" language from their writing).
199. See Durako et al., supra note 11, at 749 (suggesting memorandum checklist exhorting
students to edit "throat clearing" phrases from their drafts).
200. See id. at 732-33.
201. See NEUMANN, supra note 39, at 383-84; Levine, Course Materials, supra note 23,
at 17. Linguist Robin Lakoff identified the "tag" question as one aspect of the overly polite
and obsequious features of American women's speech. ROBIN LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND
WOMAN'S PLACE, 53 (1975).
202. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
203. Weiss & Melling, supra note 17, at 1344.
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powerful in our society; rather, they tend to be found in the speech
of those without power, especially women.2" Similarly, students
from cultures other than Western culture may have a decidedly
different perspective on the meaning of certain features of
language, such as maintaining eye contact and speaking loudly."5
Thus, a consequence of the valuation of certain features of
language in legal communication is a disparate burden placed on
outsider students to change their voices to succeed, and the
underlying message that their voices and cultures are inferior.20 6
But, a thornier problem is why certain features of language are
marked as incredible or ineffective.2 7 The existence and cause
of difference in register between the powerful and powerless is a
matter of intense debate. For example, with regard to women, one
theory is that women use less powerful and effective speech styles
because they are socialized to do so, to keep them from positions
of power and to avoid offending men.20 8 Implicit in this theory
is the acceptance of the notion that certain styles of speech are,
objectively, less powerful and that women can succeed by changing
their register to copy that of men.20 9 Students of critical jurispru-
dence may recognize the commonalities shared by this linguistic
perspective and the equality theory of feminism, a theory founded
204. See generally CAMERON, supra note 2, at 70-71; LAKOFF, supra note 196, at 53-64.
I want to make clear, however, that I am not making the "essentialist" claim that all women,
or other outsiders, are biologically or otherwise predisposed to speaking a certain way. See,
e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
590-607 (1990). I realize that there is a real danger in trying to express the problem legal
language poses for outsiders. See Bartlett, supra note 19, at 1268-69. Rather, I am raising
a number of questions about why legal culture values some features of language over others
and whether this valuation contains an ideological, cultural, or sexist bias.
205. In some cultures, for example, eye contact connotes aggression, not respectful
confidence. See Frank Reynolds, Helpful Book Shows Learning A Few Foreign Customs Can
Send Key Message, J. COM., July 1, 1998, at 2C; Leslie Berger, Learning to Tell Custom from
Abuse, L. A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at Al; see also Mary Beth Marklein, What's Up In April:
Don't Forget to Pack Your Manners, USA TODAY, Mar. 20, 1989, at 1E (exhorting American
tourists to refrain from speaking loudly so as not to offend people of other cultures).
206. For example, American women tend to have higher pitched voices than American
men. Higher pitch, in American culture and American legal culture, is associated with lack
of authority and demeaned as overly emotional. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 74-75;
PRATr, supra note 39, at 329. The PRATT text advises: "If your voice normally has a high
pitch, it will tend to get even higher if you are nervous or speak too quickly .... If you
have a naturally high pitched voice, remember to speak slowly and try to lower the pitch."
Id.
207. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 71.
208. See id. at 44.
209. See id. at 71.
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upon the goal of seeking equality for women by demonstrating that
women can meet male standards.21 ° Another perspective ques-
tions why certain registers are more valued than others and
encourages the valuation of "women's language." This perspective
equates with feminist difference theory, which seeks to recognize
and value women's different voices and talents." The difference
perspective is also evident in the recent media commotion over
Ebonics and the debates over bilingualism. 2t 2  In linguistics, for
example, it is conceivable that a qualifying phrase like "maybe"
could be valued as a more accurate or honest communication of the
writer's thoughts.2 13  Or, that a rising intonation during oral
argument could be valued as effective because it is more polite or
deferential to the judges or because it connotes reasonableness or
lack of rigidity in thought.
Finally, still another perspective suggests that it is the identity
and position in the social hierarchy of the speaker-not the
particular features of speech, which may vary among members of
subdominant groups-that causes speech to be devalued.214 This
linguistic perspective shares some foundations with feminist
dominance theory and some with post-modern legal theory.
215
So, for example, a woman who pauses before answering is unsure,
210. See id. at 77; Morrison, supra note 94, at 68; Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis:
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 151, 170-72,
174 (1992).
211. See Morrison, supra note 94, at 69-70; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985);
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 57-61, 65-66, 70-72 (1988).
212. See, e.g., Eldridge Cleaver, We Need to Rescue Kids From Ebonics Education: Black
Pride, Yes. But Keep it in the Context of Standard English, LA TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at B9,
available in 1997 WL 2178002 ("The only place for Ebonics is the streets. We don't need
it in the classroom."); Bert Eljera, Defending the Ebonics Decision: Jean Quan Moves Along
the Front Lines of the Racially Charged Controversy, ASIANWEEK, Jan. 30, 1997, at 15,
available in 1997 WL 11561807 (noting that the goal of Ebonics is "to raise the learning
opportunities of black students in the same manner that Asian and Latino students have
benefitted from bilingual education"); Is Ebonics the Right Approach to Education?, ST.
LOUIS POST, Feb. 1, 1997, at 34, available in 1997 WL 3321309 ("The use of Ebonics in the
classroom would subjugate millions of inner-city children to lives of poverty by leaving them
unable to compete for the opportunities of the 21st century.").
213. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 73.
214. See id. at 74-75.
215. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE: ON SEX
DISCRIMINATION, IN FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, DIFFERENCE]; Morrison, supra note 94, at 76-77.
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a man who pauses is thoughtful.2 16 Or, a person of color who
speaks in a confident or non-conciliatory way is "uppity," but a
white person speaking the same way is "confident." '217
Probably the reality involves a combination, or even synthesis,
of these theories. And, in this synthesis lies a real double-bind for
the outsider law student. There is no question that legal language
places value on certain speech patterns, such as eye contact or
declarative intonation, as forceful and confident and devalues
others such as tag questions, rising intonation, and soft speech. The
valued speech patterns are not merely valued, they are the legal
voice, the professional voice.218 For those outsider students who
use the devalued speech patterns and associate those devalued
patterns with their outsider status, legal writing's emphasis on
teaching them to cultivate the professional voice requires a painful
dilemma: retain your outsider voice and fail to be heard or change
and "mainstream" your voice.219 On a macro level, the emphasis
on teaching the professional voice means that legal writing
perpetuates the legal culture reflected in that voice-the "slam,
slam, to the conclusion" register certainly reflects the hierarchical
and combative nature of law and litigation.22 ° As muting and
216. See CAMERON, supra note 2, at 46. Again, voice pitch provides a useful example.
Is the problem that high pitch is "objectively" less authoritative, or that, through some
distorted transitive logic, that women tend to have a higher pitch and women are not viewed
as authoritative, therefore, higher pitch is not authoritative? See id. at 74-75; see also
Morrison, supra note 94, at 76.
217. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 100, at 1368. During a presentation by Professor
Cunningham in which he described the judge's reaction to Mr. Johnson's perception of the
racial implications of his arrest, Professor Derrick Bell commented that Mr. Johnson got into
trouble (during both his interaction with the police officer and the judge) because his verbal
resistance to being treated with disrespect caused him to be "viewed as an uppity nigger."
Id. at 1368 & n.194.
218. See Finley, supra note 2, at 887; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 206, at 44-45.
219. The dilemma that legal pedagogy poses for outsiders has been described by many
outsider legal scholars. See, e.g., Matsuda, Quail Calls, supra note 155, at 298 (noting that
the "constant shifting of consciousness produces sometimes madness, sometimes genius,
sometimes both."); Montoya, Trenzas, supra note 14, at 202, 204-5; Weiss & Melling, supra
note 17, at 1320. Of course, not all outsider students think of themselves as having an
"outsider" voice or having aspects of their voice that they think are linked inextricably to
their outsider status. My point is only that some outsider students (and lawyers) do feel that
features of their voices are linked to their outsider status and, that by forcing them to
change, the law and legal writing are devaluing that part of them. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 206, at 42-43.
220. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 2, at 899. Moreover, because lawyers are trained
primarily in the adversary system, the language of this system affects behavior even outside
the adversary context. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System
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determinism theory would predict, the dominant language-the
"professional voice"-perpetuates the dominant culture of the
hierarchy, and the existence of the culture supports the use and
teaching of the dominant language in a perpetual loop.
Injecting dominance theory into the dilemma exacerbates it.
If it is likely that the use of the valued register by the powerless
will be viewed differently-and negatively-then the social view's
goal of assimilation is not only potentially injurious to outsider
students but also an empty promise. Professor Carrie Menkel-
Meadow recounts her experience with a judge who threatened to
hold her in contempt for cross-examining a witness, even though
her adversary had not objected, because the judge thought it
"inappropriate for a young lady to be so argumentative. 221
Similarly, Professor Mairi Morrison tells a similar story of linguistic
bias in the context of first-year moot court. During the critique
after the argument, a female judge criticized the female advocates
mannerism of "cocking their heads" as "cutesy," whereas Professor
Morrison interpreted the same mannerism as indicative of careful
listening.222 Thus, the outsider student's dilemma of whether to
change her voice is complicated by the notion that it might make
no difference-she still might not be "heard." But she almost
certainly will not be heard if she speaks in the devalued register.
So, for the outsider student and lawyer, legal writing's emphasis on
fluency and assimilation imposes a Hobson's choice.
IV. Conclusion: Toward Teaching Critical Thinking in the
Context of Lawyering
Having identified the problem, the dilemma now becomes what
to do about it. Law schools cannot sit back and hope that the
profession changes. As teachers of law and legal language, all of
us must acknowledge our contribution to our students' alienation
and our shaping of the practice of law. But we cannot ignore the
realities of legal language and law practice. As Professor Lucinda
Finley has written: "We cannot get away from the law, even if that
is what we would like to do .... Nor can we abandon caring
in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 37 (1996). Weiss &
Melling, supra note 17, at 1337-39.
221. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 206, at 54 n.81.
222. Morrison, supra note 94, at 62.
1998]
I DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
whether the law hears us [or our students] .... [W]e must engage
it.,223
We must find a way to teach our students to be effective
lawyers, to be heard, while simultaneously minimizing the potential
for and damage of muting. Many scholars have spoken and written
about ideas that are potentially useful to alleviate the muting
problem inherent in teaching legal language. Legal writing
conference presentations have focused on how to incorporate
feminism, critical race theory, and issues surrounding sexual
orientation into legal writing pedagogy.224  As a start, legal
writing professionals can learn about the problem of outsider voices
in legal writing and become more sensitive to outsider student
concerns. As a result, the professor can point out bias in legal
language and reasoning in comments on drafts, in class, or during
conferences. An acknowledgement of the bias in legal language
and reasoning may validate the feelings of outsider students. Legal
writing professionals have also spoken about the need for more
assignments that integrate issues of race, gender, sexual orientation,
and disability, and the concurrent need to deal in the classroom, in
conferences, and in the drafts with the issues of bias in those
areas.
225
All of these practical solutions go a way toward relieving some
of the problems associated with muting. But they are not enough.
The problem of muting requires a more systemic re-evaluation of
legal writing and law school pedagogy.226 To this end, Professor
Marina Angel argues for injecting narrative theory into the first
223. Finley, supra note 2, at 906-07.
224. See, e.g., Diana Pratt, presentation at the Legal Writing Institute Conference (July
30, 1994) (entitled Educating the Judge: Diversity and Multiculturalism in Legal Writing)
(discussing how to educate judges about different social, cultural, and economic circum-
stances) [hereinafter Pratt, Diversity]; Mark E. Wojcik & Samara Marion, presentation at the
Legal Writing Institute Conference (July 28, 1994) (entitled Pink Ink: Pedagogy and Sexual
Orientation) (discussing how to integrate themes of sexual orientation, race, gender, and
disability into legal writing assignments); Kristin Woolever, presentation at the Legal Writing
Institute Conference (July 30, 1994) (entitled Feminist Discourse and the Legal Argument)
(discussing how to incorporate feminist discourse into persuasive writing pedagogy).
225. See supra note 219. However, giving assignments that highlight issues of race,
gender, or sexual orientation is not enough and might exacerbate the problem because of the
acute bias problems of the law in these areas. Certainly, assignments that highlight areas of
social concern must be taught with a sensitivity to the issues raised and with the knowledge
that extra time must be spent discussing the politics of the law.
226. This article focuses on the problems in legal writing, and so the solutions focus on
legal writing. But, many areas of law school pedagogy are ripe for reform.
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year of law school to encourage students to tell their own stories,
in their own words.227 Legal writing professionals and other law
teachers have begun to experiment with this approach by requiring
students to keep journals or diaries.2"
Professor Mairi Morrison argues for a bilingual approach to
legal writing that teaches the value of both the legal voice and the
personal voice, especially the voices of outsiders.229 Professor
Morrison drew this idea from the writings of Mari Matsuda on
"multiple consciousness," a kind of bilingualism required of
outsiders who must learn to fit into the law and legal language.23°
Professor Morrison also recommended that law schools require a
feminist jurisprudence component to first-year moot court to
explain the biases in legal language and reasoning.231 Relatedly,
Professor Kate Bartlett describes a methodology of "positionality,"
which urges that feminist legal theorists accept the varying
perspectives of the law and learn to test their legal theory by
looking at it from many different positions and perspectives.
23 2
A pedagogy that incorporated the "positionality" method would
encourage students to try to think about different potential
perspectives in a dispute, including their own perspectives, and to
use the resultant knowledge to analyze texts, disputes, and language
critically.23
3
Professor Clark Cunningham, speaking in the context of client
representation, urges a methodology of ethnography, the goal of
which is to penetrate unfamiliar cultures and concepts by studying
227. See Angel, supra note 17, at 233-34.
228. See, e.g., J.P. Ogilvy, The Use of Journals in Legal Education: A Tool For Reflection,
3 CLINICAL L. REv. 55 (1996).
229. See Morrison, supra note 94, at 76. Similarly, Professors Julius Getman and
Elizabeth Hodges urge that law schools must teach students to incorporate the "human,"
personal voice into the professional voice. See Getman, supra note 91, at 579; Hodges, supra
note 91, at 639. Professor Getman writes: "The myopic focus on professional voice does a
major pedagogical disservice by preparing law students for only a part of what lawyers do."
Getman, supra note 91, at 579.
230. Matsuda, Quail Calls, supra note 155, at 299. Professor Mairi Morrison also argues
for the teaching of multiple consciousness and bilingualism in the moot court context. See
Morrison, supra note 94, at 81-82.
231. See Morrison, supra note 94, at 81-82. Of course, the feminist readings would have
to be chosen carefully to avoid some of the biases that have plagued feminist jurisprudence.
232. See Bartlett, supra note 19, at 881-85.
233. See Meyer, supra note 91, at 794. Professor Meyer praises New York University
Law School's lawyering program because it strives to train competent professionals in a
deeply self-reflected context. See id. (emphasis added).
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the words, images, institutions, and behaviors.234 Ethnography
applied to familiar surroundings like law or legal discourse is called
ethnomethodology, which involves treating the familiar as
"strange," meticulously recording the patterns of events and
"microscopically" analyzing the record.235 Professor Cunningham
suggests that applied to the attorney-client relationship, ethno-
methodology might reveal "patterns of domination, control, and
incomprehension that persist even when the attorney is consciously
attempting to develop an open, listening 'client-centered' relation-
ship. 23 6  Beyond the attorney-client relationship, ethnomethod-
ology may have much to offer the law professor struggling with the
muting of outsider students. Not only might such a method give us
insight into our relationships with our students, but might also be
useful to incorporate into our teaching of legal language and legal
texts. Perhaps part of the muting problem could be remedied by
teaching students to treat legal texts as "strange," in part to
discover the patterns of bias and domination inherent in those
texts.
Experimenting with all or any of these concepts would be a big
step toward attacking the problem of muting in law school, because
they include as a requirement in law school the teaching of the
additional skills of critical legal theory and methodology.237 Many
law schools offer upper-level courses on critical jurisprudence,
feminist jurisprudence, or even law and linguistics. But all of these
courses focus on scholarly thought and writing and most do not
teach how to translate critical theory into the practice of law.238
234. See Cunningham, supra note 100, at 1341.
235. See id. at 1342. Professor Cunningham gives Deborah Tannen's bestselling book,
You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND, as an example of ethnomethodology, because Professor
Tannen discovered patterns of domination in male-female speech through meticulous
examination of thousands of male-female conversations. See Cunningham, supra note 100,
at 1347.
236. See id. at 1348.
237. This Article is meant to begin the dialogue on how to solve the muting problem.
Critical legal theory and methodology, both the ones mentioned here and others, can be
incorporated into law school and legal writing pedagogy in any number of ways. The idea
is to include somehow the teaching of the biases in legal language in the quest to humanize
and personalize the teaching of law. It is beyond the scope of this Article to list exhaustively
the critical theories that might work, or to give a blueprint for their incorporation into legal
writing.
238. See, e.g., Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law
Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561, 597-601 (1997). Professor
Parker advises that law students should be encouraged to "think on paper" about justice and
law reform and describes several creative ways to encourage students to think analytically
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This is a crucial, missing link. First, because the critical theory
courses have a scholarly bent and legal writing has a practical bent,
students will likely compartmentalize critical theory as a scholarly
activity and not as a part of good, effective lawyering. Second,
many students may never take a course in critical theory-or may
devalue them as impractical-because they are not required.
Finally, if muting means anything, it means that after the first-year
curriculum, especially legal writing, many students will already be
assimilated into legal language-that, after all, is the goal. So,
critical theory must be introduced in the first year, and must be
followed by upper-level, practical lawyering courses that teach
critical theory and how to use it in law practice.
To have any affect on both the muting of individuals and the
ultimate problem of muting in law practice, critical theory and
methodology would have to be incorporated in the first year and
would have to be included in legal writing because it is the primary
course that teaches lawyering and legal language most explicitly.
The introduction of critical theory in the first year would have to
be supplemented by upper-level practical courses that teach more
critical theory and methodology in the context of lawyering. It is
crucial that the critical theory and methodology be introduced in
the first year and that it have a significant place in all first-year and
upper-level courses that teach practical lawyering skills. Students
must learn to use critical legal thinking in the context of lawyer-
ing-to use critical thinking in predictive writing, persuasive
writing, legal analysis, oral advocacy, negotiation, and client
representation. And, students must be exposed to some critical
theory at the same time that they are learning conventional legal
analysis and language. At a minimum, this would teach students to
recognize bias in legal language and would validate students who
feel uncomfortable with legal language. It would also educate
"insider" students about the limitations and biases of the law and
legal language. Through education, legal educators can change the
about issues of policy, mostly in the context of scholarly writing. She also advocates giving
writing and lawyering assignments that require students to confront ethical issues and issues
of professionalism. All of these suggestions are excellent and, in many ways, consistent with
my proposal here. But, my proposal differs in that I believe that law students should be
encouraged to think about law reform and the bias of legal language in the context of
lawyering, not scholarship. Ethics and professionalism are a part of this proposal, but they
are not the whole picture.
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audience targeted by the process view and the language taught by
the social view, and begin to end the cycle of muting.
The practical problems of incorporating critical theory and
methodology into first-year and any upper-level legal writing
courses will be evident to anyone who has ever taught legal writing.
Legal writing professors, although rising in status, continue to be
underpaid and overworked. The individual attention required to
teach basic lawyering to novices, such as critiques of multiple drafts
and conferences, is extremely time consuming. Most professors
barely have the time and course hours to teach conventional legal
analysis, must less critical theory, positionality method or "meticu-
lous" analysis.239 Throughout this Article, I have noted that even
legal writing professors conscious of bias in legal language are hard-
pressed to share their knowledge because of low credit and class
hours. And because most legal writing professors have no job
security and are paid less than half of what their "doctrinal"
colleagues are paid, they have little incentive to do more than they
already do.24 ° To suggest that they do so under current status
conditions and salary structures would be very unfair.
Thus, law schools must take the initiative. Our responsibilities
to our outsider students do not end with admission, and we cannot
continue to foist all the blame on the profession. The epistemic
view of writing and the determinist view of language teach us that
as legal educators, we participate in shaping the contours and
culture of legal language. Language is not static-it is dynamic and
it can be changed. Teaching critical legal theory in the context of
teaching lawyering skills-in the first year and beyond-goes a long
way toward recognizing our role in shaping legal language. But, it
requires that law schools commit to the goal of teaching students
to lawyer, to increase the status and pay of those who teach legal
writing and lawyering, and to devote the required time and credit
hours to allowing those courses to include a substantial component
of critical theory. Without doubt, the commitment would be worth
the payoff: not only will we teach our students to challenge biased
language and send them out to the legal market with the tools they
239. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 77-79, 87; Morrison, supra note 94, at 78-
79; Jan M. Levine, presentation at the Legal Writing Institute Conference (1996) (entitled
Skills Training and Legal Writing Programs: "Tastes Great or Less Filling?") (unpublished
transcript on file with author).
240. See generally Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Association of Legal Writing Directors & Legal
Writing Institute 1998 Survey Results (on file with author).
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need to succeed and the encouragement to stretch language and
think outside the box, but in doing so, we can make law
school-and law practice-a less alienating place.

